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Does the Alaska Constitution Provide Broader Protection for
Taking or Damage of Property? An Analysis
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INTRODUCTION
The federal and state courts are charged under the Takings
Clause to protect property from governmental action that
unreasonably interferes with rights of ownership and use.
Historically, the Takings Clause was interpreted to refer to eminent
domain, i.e., formal actions to acquire property and physical
occupation or seizure of property in the absence of formal
condemnation. Through the beginning of the twentieth century,
courts interpreted the government's exercise of regulatory authority
over property to not interfere with the owners' rights where basic
elements of due process were satisfied. The Supreme Court
eventually recognized that the police power was not immune from
takings protection.
In the last 30 years, takings law has been transformed with the
expansion of regulatory programs concerning conservation, resources
management, and environmental protection. Modern takings law has
also been applied to a variety of financial and personal interests apart
from real property. Unfortunately, takings law has become one of
the most convoluted subjects in constitutional law due to these
factors, coupled with the Supreme Court's acknowledged difficulty
in establishing ground rules for takings protection.' Complicating
* Mr. Albert practices environmental, natural resources, land use, and
property law in Anchorage, Alaska. He earned his B.A. from the University of
California at Berkeley in 1970, his M.Reg.Planning from Cornell Univ. in 1980,
and his J.D. from Univ. of Denver Sturm College of Law in 1984. Mr. Albert
acknowledges and appreciates the comments of Professor Jan Laitos; John A.
Carver, Jr., Professor of Law, Univ. of Denver Sturm College of Law; and James
Burling, Director of Litigation, Pacific Legal Foundation, regarding a draft of this
article.
1. See e.g. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 649-651 n. 15 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the attempt to differentiate
'regulation' from 'taking' [is] the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field
of contemporary land use law"); Richard Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on
Lucas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1411, 1432 (1993) ("The Court's inability to develop a
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this difficulty has been the judiciary's reluctance to impose liability
rules that financially burden governments from discharging their
functions.2
Many state constitutions, including Alaska's, protect property
from either taking or damage. 3  Article I, § 18 of the Alaska
Constitution states, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation" (emphasis added).
According to the Alaska Supreme Court, the presence of the damage
clause confers broader protection to private property than the Takings
Clause in the U.S. Constitution. However, the Alaska Court's
decisions have neither clearly applied the damage clause nor
differentiated between state and federal takings protection so as to
effectively delineate the broader rights available under the Alaska
Constitution.
Nonetheless, the Alaska Supreme Court has developed a
takings jurisprudence associated with contemporaneous
developments in federal takings law. Since statehood in 1959, the
Alaska Supreme Court has issued over 30 takings decisions
interpreting the Alaska or U.S. Constitutions.4  While the Alaska
coherent, consistent framework for takings analysis is symptomatic of a deeper
flaw in the Court's thinking"); Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 1165, 1170 (1967) ("The results [of takings decisions], if thus explainable, are
nonetheless liberally salted with paradox").
2. See e.g. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)
("Government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law");
Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 324 (2002) ("Treating . . . all [land use regulations] as per se takings
would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could
afford").
3. See 2A Julis Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 6.01[12][c] (3d
ed., Matthew Bender 2008) (emphasis added).
4. E.g. Hageland Aviation Serv., Inc. v. Harms, 210 P.3d 444 (Alaska
2009); Anderson v. C. Bering Sea Fishing Assn., 78 P.3d 710 (Alaska 2003); R &
Y, Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289 (Alaska 2001); Beluga Mining v. St.
Dept. ofNat. Resources, 973 P.2d 570 (Alaska 1999); Anchorage v. Sandberg, 861
P.2d 554 (Alaska 1993); St. Dept. of Nat. Resources v. Arctic Slope Regl. Corp.,
834 P.2d 34 (Alaska 1992); St. v. Doyle, 735 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1987).
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Court has found takings in several cases, its ascertainment of
liability has varied due to several factors borrowed from federal
takings precedent along with rules developed by the Alaska Court.
The Alaska Supreme Court's uneven application of Alaska versus
federal takings law has produced ambiguity regarding the extent of
property protection under the Alaska versus the U.S. Constitution.
This article is developed as follows: a synopsis of federal
takings law is provided along with a review of the Supreme Court's
understanding of "private property" subject to the Takings Clause.
First discussed is the threshold issue of property interests protected
under the Alaska Constitution in comparison to the Takings Clause
and the possible ramifications for substantive protection from "taking
or damage." The analysis then traces the Alaska Court's application
of federal takings principles along with the key factors articulated in
federal takings law. Thereafter, the Alaska Court's claim of broader
protection for damage under the Alaska Constitution is critically
evaluated. Finally, the issue of broader protection in Alaska is
analyzed through just compensation as opposed to a taking. The
conclusion is that the Alaska Supreme Court has failed to articulate
broader protection for regulatory interference with property rights
under its constitutional damage clause.
5. See Hageland 210 P.3d at 459-461 (retrospective legislation nullified
a property interest in accrued causes of action); Tlingit-Haida Regional Electr.
Auth. v. Alaska, 15 P.3d 754, 764-766 (Alaska 2001) (public utility decertification
order resulted in stranded facility); City of Kenai v. Burnett, 860 P.2d 1233, 1240-
1242 (Alaska 1993) (revocation and destruction of express easement between the
city and a developer); Bakke v. Alaska, 744 P.2d 655, 656-657 (Alaska 1987)
(landslide damage resulted in physical invasion); DeLisio v. Super. Ct. of Alaska,
740 P.2d 437, 442-443 (Alaska 1987) (appropriation of a person's labor); Alaska v.
Doyle, 735 P.2d 733, 735-737 (Alaska 1987) (airplane overflights manifested
navigational easement); Wernberg v. Alaska, 516 P.2d 1191, 1200-1201 (Alaska
1974) (destruction of littoral access).
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I. SYNOPSIS OF FEDERAL TAKINGS LAW 6
A. The Foundation of Modern Takings Law:
Mahon and Penn Central
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme
Court interpreted the Takings Clause as referring to condemnation
actions, and in the absence of formal condemnation, only those
governmental actions that resulted in physical invasion to real
property. Thus, exercise of the police power to protect public
health, safety, and welfare did not result in a taking where due
process concerns were satisfied.8 The U.S. Supreme Court first
concluded that regulatory interference with private property could
result in a taking in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.9 Writing for
the Court, Justice Holmes declared that "while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."10  In Mahon, Pennsylvania legislation
protected surface structures from subsidence due to underground coal
mining. 1 Reasoning the legislation "purports to abolish what is
recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land-a very valuable
6. There is a vast literature on federal takings law. See generally Robert
Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 Ecol. L.Q. 307 (2007);
Jan Laitos, Law of Property Rights Protection: Limitations on Governmental
Powers (Aspen 1998 & Supp. 2003); Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory Takings (3d ed.
Mathew Bender 2005). The synopsis here is ventured solely for the purpose of
evaluating Alaska Supreme Court decisions.
7. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1887) (permanent
flooding of property constituted a taking); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-28 (1982) (discussing early takings
cases involving physical invasion of property); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (discussing early interpretation of the Takings Clause).
8. See e.g. Mugler v. Kan., 123 U.S. 623, 665-70 (1887).
9. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
10. Id. Justice O'Connor has since described Justice Holmes' statement
in Mahon as a "storied but cryptic formulation." Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544
U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
11. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-413.
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estate," the Mahon Court held a taking had occurred.12
Modem takings law can be traced to the U.S. Supreme Court's
1978 seminal decision, Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New
York. 13 In Penn Central, the Court acknowledged the Takings Clause
posed a "problem of considerable difficulty," wherein it "has been
unable to develop any set formula."' 4 Consequently, whether there
has been a taking "depends largely upon the particular
circumstances" to which the Court must apply "essentially ad hoc,
factual inquires."15 Penn Central identified "several factors that have
particular significance" in the Court's takings analyses, including:
"[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant," "the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment
backed expectations," and "the character of the governmental
action."1 6 Now known as the "Penn Central factors," the ad-hoc
analysis pronounced by the Court's 1978 decision has substantially
guided federal takings law ever since.17
B. Lucas and Loretto: Per Se Takings
Subsequent to Penn Central, the Supreme Court developed
two categories of governmental action that qualify as a taking in the
absence of "case specific inquiry," i.e., analysis according to the
Penn Central factors. The first category of per se taking was
established in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. and
pertains to governmental action that manifests a physical invasion
12. Id. at 414.
13. Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City ofNew York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
14. Id. at 124.
15. Id. (citations omitted).
16. Id.
17. See e.g. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326-27, 335-336 (discussing Penn
Central and the Court's continued utilization of its three factors for case specific
inquiry where a per se taking is not alleged).
2011] 31
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and results in a permanent occupation of private property.' The
second category of per se taking involves governmental regulation
that denies an owner all economically beneficial or productive use of
its property and was established in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.19 In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court subsequently qualified the
latter per se taking category by expressly limiting its application to
"extraordinary circumstance[s]. "20
In Loretto, the U.S. Supreme Court held "a permanent
physical occupation authorized by the government is a taking without
regard to the public interests that it may serve." 21 Loretto concerned
a New York statute that required landlords to allow cable service in
their buildings for tenant use through a nominal $1 charge. 22 An
apartment building owner challenged the statute as a taking due to
the cable company's installation of a cable box and associated
equipment without her consent and without just compensation. 23 The
Court agreed and struck down the New York law as a taking.24
Drawing on its takings precedent and Penn Central's formulation,
Loretto ruled the character of the governmental action in cases of
permanent physical occupation is determinative of a taking. 25In
support, the Court applied traditional property law and takings
precedent for the proposition that permanent physical occupation
abridges an owner's right to quiet enjoyment, exclusive possession,
and control of the premises. 2 6 Loretto differentiated the Court's
traditional rule regarding non-compensable police power regulation
of property from situations where no permanent physical invasion
18. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419
(1982).
19. Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
20. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330.
21. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
22. Id. at 421.
23. Id. at 424.
24. Id. at 426, 438.
25. Id. at 426.
26. Id. at 435-436 (citing Restatement of Property § 7 (1936); Kaiser
Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 179-180 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66
(1979); U.S. v. Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
[Vol. 32
ALASKA TAKINGS LAW
occurred.27
Lucas concerned a South Carolina coastal management
statute that regulated property located in sand dunes which had been
subject to beach erosion. 2 8 The owner had purchased two residential
lots in an approved subdivision prior to the enactment.29 At the time,
the adjacent lots in the subdivision had been developed. The owner
later applied for a development permit and was denied the permit
under the coastal management law. The record was undisputed that
the permit denial destroyed any economic use to the owner's
residential lots. 30  The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
regulation as a police power intended to prevent public harm
associated with coastal development. 3 1 The Supreme Court reversed,
adopting Justice Brennan's dissent in an earlier decision, and ruled
that total deprivation of beneficial use to property is the functional
equivalent of a physical appropriation. 32 In so concluding, the Court
determined that neither Mahon's fairness principle nor Penn
Central's ad hoc inquiry could be satisfied when the government
deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial use of his
property.33
27. Id. at 430, 440.
28. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008-1009.
29. Id. at 1006.
30. Id. at 1009, 1020.
31. Id. at 1010 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404
S.E.2d 895, 896, 898-899 (S.C. 1991)); Id. at 1020-1021.
32. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 (citing San Diego Gas & Electr. Co. v. City
of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). The court also
noted prior dicta to the same effect. Id. at 1015-1016 (citing, inter alia, Nollan v.
Calif Coastal Commn., 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn.
v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987)).
33. Id. at 1017-1018 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; Mahon, 260
U.S at 415). Lucas separately justified its total taking rule under English common
law: "[f]or what is the land but the profits thereof[?]" Id. (quoting E. Coke,
Institutes vol. 1, ch. 1, § 1(1st Am. ed.1812)).
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C. Protected Property Interests after Lucas:
Background Principles of State Law and the Nuisance Exception
Aside from announcing a new rule on per se takings, Lucas
reviewed the Supreme Court's precedent on "noxious use" logic. 34
According to Lucas, "many of [the Court's] prior opinions have
suggested that 'harmful or noxious uses' of property may be
proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of
compensation. "35 However, the Court determined that its traditional
harm prevention rationale would be no longer tenable as a police
power regulation where property was sacrificed for conservation
purposes and a common law nuisance was not demonstrated.36 Lucas
reasoned:
[T]he distinction between regulation that 'prevents
harmful use' and that which 'confers benefits' is
difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective,
value-free basis; [therefore,] it becomes self-evident
that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to
distinguish regulatory 'takings'-which require
compensation-from regulatory deprivations that do
not require compensation. 37
Having discarded "noxious use logic" as a police power
rationale, Lucas then constructed a separate justification for
limitations on property use. 38 According to the Court, a "logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate" is necessary
to ascertain whether a total use prohibition burdened the title upon
acquisition. 39  At this juncture, Lucas identified "background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance" as legitimate
34. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022, 1026.
35. Id. at 1022.
36. Id. at 1024-1026.
37. Id. at 1026.
38. Id at 1027-1032.
39. Id at 1027.
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restrictions on property use.40  Even when regulatory action
eliminates all beneficial use, Lucas held the action will be sustained
against a takings challenge where the land use was "proscribe[d] ...
under relevant property and nuisance principles."4 1 As discussed
later in this article, the Court's new rule regarding background
principles becomes significant in ascertaining the presence or
absence of constitutionally protected property for takings purposes.42
D. Investment-Backed Expectations as a Penn Central Factor
and Monsanto's Notice Rule
Penn Central did not clearly explain the application of
investment-backed expectations in case specific taking inquiry.43
Instead, the Court cited precedent wherein property value was either
destroyed or rendered useless as examples of "public policies [that]
may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to
amount to a 'taking."' 44  In Penn Central, the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Board had imposed a historic preservation
ordinance on the Grand Central Terminal.45  Penn Central
Transportation Co. claimed the ordinance constituted a taking
because it was not allowed to build an office tower above the
40. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
41. Id. at 1029-1030.
42. See infra, pt. 11(B).
43. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-128; see also Daniel Mandelker,
Investment Backed Expectations in Takings Law, 27 Urb. Law. 215, 216-217
(1995) (interpretation of Penn Central's intent on investment expectations).
44. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127-128 (citing Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414-
415; Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209
U.S. 349 (1908)). Penn Central's examples of interference with investment backed
expectations describe economic impact only, and thus, do not shed light on
constitutionally protected investment expectations apart from economic impact.
45. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115-118.
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terminal building, which bore a beaux-art architectural design.46
Penn Central suggests the owner's investment expectations were
preserved because the terminal building and railroad operations
earned a reasonable return and were allowed to continue pursuant to
the city's ordinance.47 Also, the Court ruled the owner's investment
expectations would not be measured solely by its asserted property
interest in the office tower, but instead, by the "extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole-here, the city tax
block designated as the 'landmark site."' 48
The U.S. Supreme Court first reviewed its investment-backed
expectations factor in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.49  Monsanto
concerned trade secret protection associated with pesticides
registered for commercial use under federal environmental law.5 0 As
registrant, the Monsanto Company contended the government's
utilization or disclosure of its proprietary submissions after a
designated period constituted a taking.5 1  The Court rejected the
company's claim, stating Monsanto lacked investment-backed
expectations regarding confidential information it provided the
government in exchange for a federal permit, especially because the
enabling legislation expressed no promise or guarantee of preserving
confidentiality.52 Moreover, it concluded "Monsanto was on notice
of the manner in which the EPA was authorized to use and disclose
any data turned over to it by an applicant for registration."53
Monsanto was thereafter interpreted in literature and
precedent as establishing a "notice rule" whereby a person acquiring
46. Id. at 118-119.
47. Id. at 129 n. 26, 136.
48. Id. at 130-131 n. 27. Penn Central's "investment backed
expectations" factor derives from Professor Michelman's 1967 law review article.
Id. at 128 (citing Michelman, supra n. 1, at 1229-1234); see also Robert
Washburn, 'Reasonable Investment Backed Expectations' as a Factor in Defining
Property Interest, 49 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 63, 66-67 (1996)
(explaining Michelman derivation); Eagle, supra n. 6, at § 7:13(b) (same).
49. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co, 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
50. Id. at 994-996.
51. Id. at 998-999.
52. Id. at 1006-1007.
53. Id. at 1006.
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property subject to a pre-existing regulation is deemed to lack
investment-backed expectations, and a taking challenge in such
situation would therefore be rejected.54 A stronger version of
Monsanto's notice rule states that a person imparted foreseeability of
future regulation in a presently regulated industry has no investment-
backed expectations. 5 Some have argued the notice rule, taken to its
logical extreme, results in all property being disqualified from any
reasonable investment expectations due to our modem regulatory
56state. Fortunately, Mahon bars such a conclusion because, "if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 57
Many commentators have criticized Penn Central's
investment-backed expectations principle as problematic or
54. E.g. Creppel v. U.S., 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("One who
buys [property] with knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic loss");
accord Good v. U.S., 189 F.3d 1355, 1360-1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (where sales
contract of coastal wetlands recited difficulties in obtaining fill permits, the buyer
lacked investment expectations in light of Monsanto); see also Steven J. Eagle, The
Regulatory Takings Notice Rule, 24 U. Haw. L. Rev. 533, 533, 562-563 (2002);
Washburn, supra n. 48, at 76-82 (discussing the notice rule); Mandelker, supra n.
43, at 218-219, 222.
55. E.g. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227
(1986) ("[t]hose who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the
legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the
legislative end").
56. E.g. Dist. Intown Prop., Ltd. v. Dist. of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 886
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (Williams, J., concurring) ("the majority's analysis begs the
question of whether any landowner, in a world where zoning regulations are
prevalent, could ever again argue that a particular regulation was 'unexpected');
see also J. David Breemer and R.S. Radford, The (Less?) Murky Doctrine of
Investment Backed Expectations after Palazzolo, and the Lower Courts' Disturbing
Insistence in Wallowing in the Pre-Palazzolo Muck, 34 Sw. L. Rev. 351, 357-360
(2005); Richard Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web
ofExpectations, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1369, 1370-1371 (1993).
57. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
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incoherent, resulting in divided precedent and confusion in the law.
According to Professor Mandelker, the investment-backed
expectations factor is capable of multiple interpretations, including:
the landowner's expectations at the time of purchase; vested interest
in a contemporaneous regulatory approval; assumption of regulatory
risk upon acquisition of title; and expectations derived from statutes
and regulations passed by legislatures and agencies. 59  Professor
Laitos interprets the investment expectations factor to include the
following factual variables: (1) the nature and degree of the legal
change; (2) the amount of loss experienced by the property owner;
(3) the extent to which the change is unexpected; and (4) whether the
owner's expectations are reasonable. 60  Even Justice Kennedy
acknowledged "an inherent tendency towards circularity" in the
concept of investment-backed expectations, i.e., that expectations
reflect the judiciary's a priori interpretations of property transactions
rather than some objective measurement of market activity involving
the same.61
E. Palazzolo and its Revision of the Notice Rule
as a Takings Defense
Due apparently to complications associated with the notice
rule, the U.S. Sureme Court in 2000 granted certiorari in Palazzolo
v. Rhode Islanct to revisit Penn Central's investment expectations
factor. Palazzolo decided the notice rule was overly broad and held
58. See e.g. Daniel Mandelker, Investment Backed Expectations in
Takings Law, in Takings: Land Development Conditions and Regulatory Takings
after Dolan and Lucas, 119, 119 n. 2 (David L. Callies ed., American Bar
Association 1996); Laitos, supra n. 6, at §§ 11.05, 11.05 n. 4; Epstein, supra n. 56,
at 1370-1371.
59. Mandelker, supra n. 58, at 130-131.
60. Laitos, supra n. 6, at § 11.05.
61. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000), cert.
granted sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 531 U.S. 923 (Oct. 10, 2000)
(reviewing, among other issues, whether a property owner is categorically barred
from asserting a taking claim where the challenged regulation was in effect before
acquisition of title).
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a purchaser's taking claim "is not barred by the mere fact that title
was acquired after the effective date of the state -imposed
restriction." 63  The Court found the notice rule effectuates "an
expiration date on the Takings Clause" because the pre-enactment
owner is prevented from transferring its rights to the post-enactment
purchaser. 4  Accordingly, Palazollo concluded such prohibition
conflicts with a fundamental attribute of property-a right to transfer
title. 65  Further, assuming the pre-enactment owner perfected a
development right into a taking claim, the notice rule still prohibits
66transfer of such claim to a purchaser.
Justice O'Connor concurred in rejecting "the sweeping rule
that the preacquistion enactment of the use restriction ipso facto
defeats any takings claim."67 However, her opinion recommended
that the issue of regulatory notice be retained as part of Penn Central
case-specific inquiry.8 According to Justice O'Connor, the timing of
a purchaser's acquisition vis-a-vis property regulation is relevant to
63. Palazzolo v. R.I, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001).
64. Id. at 627.
65. Id at 628 (citing Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J.
1315, 1368-1369 (1993)). Palazzolo buttressed its rejection of the notice rule by
citing to Nollan, which reached a similar result for an owner who acquired property
in the California coastal zone subsequent to land use regulations that restricted
development. Id. at 629 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n. 2).
66. Id. at 628. Eminent domain law requires the owner of property on the
date of taking to be joined in the action, whereas a successor or assignee in title
lacks standing to seek compensation. Id. (citing Danforth v. U.S., 308 U.S. 271,
284 (1939); J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain, vol. 2, § 5.01[5][d][i] (3d.
rev. ed., Matthew Bender, 2000)); see also U.S. v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 20-21
(1959). Accordingly, Palazzolo concluded the notice rule would have required a
pre-enactment owner to litigate her taking claim, because only such person would
be the owner on the date of taking of a non-transferable cause of action, whereas
the purchaser taking title subject to the regulation would not. 533 U.S. at 628.
67. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 632-635.
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evaluating investment-backed expectations.69 Further, Justice
O'Connor would look at a purchaser's reliance interest in evaluating
investment expectations; however, she recognizes the state's
increasing regulation of property should not necessarily limit an
owner's rights in property disposition.70 Subsequent decisions have
been mixed on application of the notice rule, presumably as a result
of the Court's divided opinions in Palazzolo.71
F. Economic Impact as a Penn Central Factor: Diminution in
Value and Partial Takings
Penn Central noted that "diminution in property value,
standing alone, can[not] establish a 'taking,"' and cited two early
cases resulting in a 75% to 87% reduction in value, despite the lack
of a taking.72 Mahon first stated the diminution in value test; there
the Court found a taking because the regulation made coal mining
commercially impractical.73 Following Penn Central, the federal
courts have consistently upheld non-compensable regulation with
69. Id. at 632-633.
70. See id. at 634-635.
71. See e.g. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc), rev'g, Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1023-1027 (9th Cir.
2009) (split in Ninth Circuit panels regarding whether a post-enactment purchaser
is entitled to investment expectations after Palazzolo); see also James Burling, The
Latest Take on Background Principles and the States'Law ofProperty After Lucas
and Palazzolo, 24 U. Haw. L. Rev. 497, 529-530 (2002) (discussing post-
Palazzolo cases); Breemer & Radford, supra n. 56, at 403-417 (discussing post-
Palazzolo cases regarding both total and partial takings).
72. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)).
However, neither Euclid nor Hadacheck were takings cases. Euclid, 272 U.S. at
386, was a substantive due process challenge to a zoning ordinance, while
Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 409-410, was a habeas corpus petition challenging a
misdemeanor prosecution for violation of a land use ordinance.
73. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 ("One fact for consideration in determining
such limits [of the police power] is the extent of the diminution"); Id. at 414 (the
Pennsylvania regulation "make[s] it commercially impracticable to mine certain
coal [which] has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating or destroying it").
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substantial reductions of property value in the range of 60% or
higher. 74 Conversely, the same courts find a taking where the loss in
valuation exceeds 80%.75 In dictum, Lucas acknowledged, "in at
least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing, while
the landowner with a total loss will recover in full." 76 With these
severe results, Penn Central's diminution in value factor may be
interpreted to mean that a regulation is non-compensable under the
Takings Clause if economically viable use of property remains-
however de minimis or meager that may be.
Lucas' disconnect between compensable versus non-
compensable regulation illustrates the confounding nature of the
Court's takings jurisprudence: "Takings law is full of these 'all-or-
nothing' situations."7 In attempting to mollify this harsh regime,
while following Lucas' guidance, the Federal Circuit developed a
"partial regulatory taking" rule in Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v.
United States.78 However, the economic impact in Florida Rock was
eventually determined to be a 71% reduction in value. 79
Consequently, the Federal Circuit's version of a partial taking rule
appears slightly less onerous than non-compensable losses decided
under other Penn Central precedent.80 Tahoe-Sierra did recognize a
partial regulatory taking rule but declined to alter Penn Central's
criteria for case specific inquiry, including the economic impact
74. E.g. Brace v. U.S., 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 357, 357 n. 33 (2006) (collecting
federal cases).
75. E.g. id. at n. 32 (collecting federal cases).
76. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n. 8 (emphasis in original).
77. Id.
78. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. U.S., 18 F.3d 1560, 1568-1571 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
79. Id, on remand, 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 31, 36 (1999).
80. Compare Brace, 72 Fed. Cl. at 357 n. 33 with Fla. Rock, 45 Fed. Cl.
at 36.
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factor.8 I
G. Agins, Lingle and Due Process Versus Takings Claims
Two years after handing down its Penn Central decision, the
Supreme Court decided Agins v. City of Tiburon.82 Agins involved a
facial taking challenge to an "open-space" zoning ordinance that
limited construction on a previously purchased 5-acre tract of land to
less than five single-family dwellings. 83  Seeking to determine
"whether the mere enactment of the zoning ordinance constitutes a
taking," the Court announced a disjunctive rule of decision:
The application of a general zoning law to a particular
property effects a taking if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests . . . or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land.84
Agins' first test was based on Nectow v. Cambridge,85 while
Agins' second test was based upon Penn Central. Nectow was an
early decision of the Court that struck down a land use restriction that
violated due process.86 In Nectow, an owner challenged a municipal
zoning ordinance that classified his land to residential but not
commercial uses.87 A master found this classification would not
81. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 318-319, 322, 326. For an economist's
take on Penn Central' s economic impact factor, see William Wade, Penn Central's
Ad Hocery Yields Inconsistent Takings Decisions, 42 Urb. Law. 549 (2010);
William Wade, "Sophistical and Abstruse Formulas" Made Simple: Advances in
Measurement of Penn Central 's Economic Damage Prongs and Estimation of
Economic Damages in the Federal Claims and Federal Circuit Courts, 38 Urb.
Law. 337 (2006).
82. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), overruled, Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005).
83. Id. at 257-258.
84. Id. at 260 (emphasis added) (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S.
183, 188 (1928); Penn Central, 483 U.S. at 138 n. 36).
85. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
86. Id. at 189.
87. Id. at 185-186.
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support public health, safety and welfare because "no practical use
could be made of the land for residential purposes." Applying both
tests, Agins determined the local zoning action supported a legitimate
state interest in land use regulation and the ordinance neither
prevented the owner's best use of its land nor extinguished a
fundamental attribute of ownership; thus, the Court concluded a
taking had not occurred.89
Although Agins' "substantially advances" test has been
recited in federal takings law for over thirty years, it has never really
been applied.90 In 2005, the Supreme Court determined Agins was
improperly decided and overruled it.91 The Lingle Court reviewed
the early decisions on which Agins relied, interpreted its
"substantially advances" inquiry to be a means-ends test, and
concluded this test sounded in due process rather than a taking. 92
Notably, the Court reasoned:
[T]he 'substantially advances' inquiry reveals nothing
about the magnitude or character of the burden a
particular regulation imposes on private property
rights. Nor does it provide any information about how
any regulatory burden is distributed among property
owners.93
While Lingle discarded Agins as a taking case, it simultaneously
88. Id. at 187.
89. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
90. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546 (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334; City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999); Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1016; Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992); U.S. v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985)).
91. Id. at 545.
92. Id. at 540-542.
93. Id. at 542 (emphasis in original).
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reaffirmed the Court's taking jurisprudence, including Penn Central's
-94case-specific inquiry.
An incidental consequence of Lingle may be the
subordination or substantial alteration of Penn Central's "character of
the governmental action" factor due to the Court's particular
emphasis on the two other factors: "the Penn Central inquiry turns in
large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a
regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it interferes
with legitimate property interests." 95 Thus, subsequent precedent has
recognized that character of the governmental action must be
reassessed to achieve consistency with Lingle's emphasis on the
magnitude and distribution of regulatory burden.9 6
H. Character of the Governmental Action as a Penn Central Factor
Where the bona fides of governmental regulation are not
questioned, the character of governmental action is typically not
decisive in federal takings law. 97 Still, the character of the action
becomes relevant when: (1) the relative burden versus benefit of a
94. Id. at 545 ("We emphasize that our holding today-that the
'substantially advances' formula is not a valid takings test--does not require us to
disturb any of our prior holdings").
95. Id. at 540; see also D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The
Potential Long Term Impacts of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings
and Substantive Due Process, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 343, 353-355 (2005); Robert G.
Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process from Takings
Doctrine, 30 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 371, 404 (2006); Dale Whitman, Deconstructing
Lingle: Implications for Takings Doctrine, 40 John Marshall L. Rev. 573, 581-582
(2006) (questioning the continued relevance of Penn Central's character of action
factor after Lingle).
96. See e.g. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. U.S., 559 F.3d 1260, 1277-1278
(Fed. Cir. 2009) ("[federal circuit] courts recognize that Lingle alters the calculus")
(citing Spoklie v. Mont., 411 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005)); Adams v. Village of
Wesley Chapel, 259 Fed. Appx. 545, 549-550 (4th Cir. 2007) (unpublished)); see
also Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.
2007); A Helping Hand, LLC v. Balt. Co., 515 F.3d 356, 396 n. 6 (4th Cir. 2008)).
97. See e.g. Fla. Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 40 ("There is no dispute . . . as to
whether preservation of the wetlands through the Corps' implementation of the
Clean Water Act serves to advance legitimate state interests").
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regulation is weighed;98 (2) the police power is exercised for the
purpose of protecting public health and safety interests as opposed to
other regulatory objectives;99 (3) there are questions regarding
causation, i.e., whether the governmental action caused the regulatory
interference with the property;' 00 or (4) the good faith of the
government's actions is placed at issue.101 Alternative suggested
criteria for character of the action have been identified in takings
commentary.102
Following Penn Central, the Supreme Court has frequently
cited two principles in evaluating character of the action. The first is
Mahon's principle of an "average reciprocity of advantage," 03 which
98. See e.g. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; Fla. Rock, 18 F.3d at 1570-
1571.
99. E.g, Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 485-486 ("the character of the
action involved here weighs heavily against finding a taking" due to public safety
considerations in mining subsidence legislation); Rose Acre Farms, 559 F.3d at
1279-1282 (USDA regulation directed at preventing salmonella virus in poultry
farms served important public health objective).
100. See e.g. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regl. Plan.
Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1245-1248 (D.Nev. 1999) (three year permitting
moratorium held not to be proximate cause of alleged taking due to court
injunction), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 216 F.3d 764, 782 (9th Cir. 2000)
(affirming temporary moratorium issue); City Natl. Bank of Miami v. U.S., 33 Fed.
Cl. 224, 231-232 (1995) (problem of joint and several liability where both federal
and state regulation affected property).
101. See e.g. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333 (agency's "stalling" in order to
avoid final decision on merits could support a taking); City of Monterey, 526 U.S.
at 698-699, 706 (city's repeated rejections of development plans suggested dilatory
tactics, which, together with justifications not reasonably related to legitimate
regulation, could support jury verdict for property owner in § 1983 taking action);
Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9 (indicating in dictum that "extraordinary delay" in
permitting process could support a taking).
102. See e.g. Melz, supra n. 6, at 341-346.
103. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. The Court compared the absence of
reciprocity in Mahon, wherein the benefitting owners had bargained away their
right of surface support, with another case, Plymouth Coal Co. v. Penn., 232 U.S.
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ascertains whether the regulatory burden on the property owner is
balanced by benefits exchanged with other owners.1 04 The second is
the principle stated in Armstrong v. United States, 0 5 which inquires
whether the burden imposed on a property owner should "in all
fairness and justice . . . be borne by the public as a whole."' 0 6 These
principles overlap to the extent the Court compares the regulation's
effect on the takings claimant with the effects on similarly situated
property owners. Unfortunately, the precedent does not yield clear
standards because the courts have failed to consistently describe or
measure the benefits and burdens of challenged regulations. 107 Still,
federal courts frequently discuss these principles in applying Penn
Central case-specific inquiry. 0 8
1I. THE IDENTIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED PROPERTY FOR TAKING PURPOSES
Fundamental to takings law is ascertaining whether a claim
qualifies as constitutional property.109 This component of takings
531 (1914), wherein the mineral estate owners and their employees benefitted from
mutual sub-adjacent support. Id.
104. See e.g. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715-716 (1987); Keystone
Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 491-492; Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
105. Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
106. Id. at 49. See also e.g. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 542-543; Tahoe-
Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332, 336; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n. 4 (discussing Armstrong's fairness and
justice principle).
107. For a critical analysis of the Armstrong and Mahon principles and
their ambiguous significance in regulatory takings law, see Thomas Merrill, Why
Lingle is Half Right, 11 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 421, 424-425 (2010); Joseph L. Sax, The
Property Rights Sweepstakes: Has Anyone Held the Winning Ticket, 34 Vt. L. Rev.
157, 162 171-172 (2009); William W. Wade & Robert L. Bunting, Average
Reciprocity of Advantage: "Magic Words" or Economic Reality-Lessons from
Palazzolo, 39 Urb. Law. 319 (2007); Eagle, supra n. 6, at § 7.7(a)(1).
108. Supra nn. 104, 106 and accompanying text (discussing the two
principles commonly used to evaluate the "character of the governmental action"
factor); see also Rose Acre Farms, 559 F.3d at 1282-1283; Maritrans v. U.S., 342
F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Fla. Rock, 18 F.3d at 1570-1571.
109. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1000-1001; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 24-
25.
[Vol. 32
ALASKA TAKINGS LAW
law has magnified over the last forty years in conjunction with the
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence. Part II of this article traces
the identification and refinement of protected property under the U.S.
Constitution and then examines how the Alaska Supreme Court treats
the subject. The issue of property status is significant for purposes of
federalism in constitutional interpretation; that is, whether state
versus federal courts shall decide if a property interest qualifies for
taking protection. The issue of property status is also significant
because, without such status, no taking protection applies.
A. The Pre-Lucas Framework for Identiying Property in
Taking Cases
The Takings Clause protects "private property" from taking
without compensation while the Due Process Clause protects
"property" according to due process of law.1 10 However, the Fifth
Amendment defines neither term.111 While the Constitution does
contain a Property Clause,'l2 this refers to the public domain and the
federal government's property interests rather than "private
property." 13
In Board of Regents v. Roth,'14 the Supreme Court developed
the modem rule regarding protection of property interests under the
Fifth Amendment. Roth concerned a non-tenured university teacher
whom the Court ruled was not eligible to claim continued
employment after his one year contract was not renewed.' 15  The
110. U.S. Const., amend. V.
I 11. See id.
112. U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
113. See generally George C. Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Public
Natural Resources Law vol. 1, §§ 3:10-3:13 (2d ed. West 2010) (discussing the
Property Clause).
114. Bd ofRegents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 504 (1972).
115. Id. at 569.
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threshold question was whether the teacher's claim qualified as
constitutionally protected property under the Due Process Clause.116
Reviewing its precedent, the Court decided that "[t]o have a property
interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than . . . a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim
of entitlement to it."11 7 In evaluating the teacher's claim of property
entitlement, the Court provided an explanation that has been followed
ever since:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the
Constitution. Rather they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understanding that stem from an independent source
such as state law-rules or understandings that secure
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement
to those benefits." 8
Roth was illustrative of the Supreme Court's shift in the
1970's towards "new property" in due process jurisprudence.'l 9
Through a series of decisions, the Court recognized a variety of
statutory entitlements as worthy of due process protection where the
claimants demonstrated expectation and reliance interests on
established governmental benefits.120  By comparison, a narrower
spectrum of property interests are protected under the Takings Clause
because "private property" has its source in the private markets, the
116. Id. at 571-572.
117. Id. at 577.
118. Id.
119. E.g. Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 10.9 at 514-516
(1st ed. Foundation Press 1978); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of
Constitutional Property, 86 Va. L. Rev. 885, 918 (2000); Schneider v. Calif Dept.
of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1998). The term "new property" in
due process law originates from a 1964 law review article, Charles Reich, The New
Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964), which the Supreme Court subsequently
recognized. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n. 8 (1970).
120. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77 (discussing cases; citations omitted).
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common law, and statutes apart from governmental entitlements.121
As Roth noted, "[t]he Court has also made clear that the property
interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond
actual ownership of real estate, chattels or money."l 22  Though
property interests in statutory entitlements may also be
constitutionally protected under the Takings Clause,12 3  their
protection is qualified for various reasons associated with enabling
authority by comparison to private property interests not created by
government.1 24
Despite its antecedents in due process, the Supreme Court has
consistently followed Roth for purposes of identifying
constitutionally protected property in takings cases.125 Accordingly,
121. E.g., Adams v. U.S., 391 F.3d 1212, 1220, 1220 n. 4 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("entitlements are often referred to as 'property interests' within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause . . . , but such references have no relevance to whether they are
'property' under the Takings Clause"); Laitos, supra n. 6, at § 5.02; Merrill, supra
n. 119, at 956-957.
122. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-572.
123. See generally Jan G. Laitos & Richard Westfall, Governmental
Interference with Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1,
23-25 (1987); Laitos, supra n. 6, at § 6.04[A][3].
124. E.g. U.S. v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104-105 (1985) ("This power to
qualify existing property rights is particularly broad with respect to the 'character'
of the property rights at issue here [i.e. public land mining claims]"). Takings
protection for public natural resources is a litigious topic; however, the subject is
beyond the scope of this article. See e.g. Maria Mansfield, When "Private" Rights
Meet "Public" Rights: the Problems of Labeling and Regulatory Takings, 65 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 193 (1994); Karolyn King Nelson, Takings Law West of the Pecos:
Inverse Condemnation of Federal Oil and Gas Lease Rights, 37 Nat. Resources J.
253 (1997); Coggins & Glicksman, supra n. 113, at § 4:20, 4:23, 4:28; Laitos &
Westfall, supra n. 124.
125. E.g. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998); Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1030-1031; Monsanto, 477 U.S. at 55-56; Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454
U.S. 516, 525 (1982); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,
164-165 (1980).
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federal courts look to non-constitutional sources of law in
ascertaining the presence of state property. This has led
commentators to characterize the Court as adopting a "positivist"
approach in defining property for takings purposes.1 2 6 As Professor
Merrill has stated, "'positivism' has been employed as a term of art
to distinguish non-constitutional law, including federal and state
statutory, administrative and common law, from law derived directly
from the Constitution." 127 A critical premise to the positivist method
for identifying property is that federal courts do not independently
evaluate or redefine state property status in adjudicating takings
claims.128
However, the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence does not
strictly adhere to a positivist approach; its precedent has disregarded
or subordinated state authority to the Court's own conception of
property. 129  In this regard, commentators suggest the Court's
departures from a positivist view of state property law support a
"normative" approach to property interests under the Takings
Clause.130  Professor Merrill believes the Court's identification of
property interests depends upon federal constitutional criteria, which
126. Barton Thompson, Judicial Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449, 1522-
1523, 1525-1526 (1990); Laitos, supra n. 6, at § 4.02; Merrill, supra n. 119, at
920, 920 n. 144 (citations omitted), 922.
127. Merrill, supra n. 119, at 920 n. 144.
128. See id. at 921; Laitos, supra n. 6, at § 4.04; Thompson, supra n. 126,
at 1524-1525.
129. See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 161-162, 165-167 (finding interest in
IOLTA account was property of the client according to common law in Texas and
other jurisdictions, even though Texas Supreme Court rule declared such accounts
to be non-interest bearing); E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 529-537 (retroactive
application of employer withdrawal liability under ERISA insured pension plans
found a taking without identifying a property interest according to Roth or
otherwise).
130. See Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 9-7, 609 (2d ed.
Foundation Press 1988) ("[E]xpectations protected by the [takings] clause must
have their protection outside positive law"); see also Laitos, supra n. 6, at § 4.02;
Merrill, supra n. 119, at 934-935, 935 n.199, 942, 950-951 (property defined
through social expectations or other normative commitments rather than state law
sources); Thompson, supra n. 126, at 1526, 1530-1531, 1536-1537.
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he describes as a "patterning definition" approach. '3 Such approach
involves comparing social expectations of property ownership or
other normative considerations against the state law sources in
question.132 Professor Thompson believes the Court's derivation of
property by positivist sources alone results in indeterminate outcomes
as to the level of constitutional protection, and hence, the Court has
occasionally supplemented state law with independent sources
pertaining to owners' expectations or normative values. 133
The Court itself has alluded to "core" or "fundamental"
notions of property being protected under the Takings Clause without
regard to state law sources.134 However, the Court presumably has
been reluctant to articulate a normative theory of property due to
federalism concerns as well as its aversion to revisiting earlier
"Lochnerian" doctrine that questioned the wisdom of legislation.135
In conclusion, the federal judiciary's deference to state non-
constitutional sources for determining property, coupled with its
willingness in specific instances to establish an independent
131. Merrill, supra n. 119, at 893-894, 952.
132. Id. at 926-927, 952, 969.
133. Thompson, supra n. 111, at 1522-1523, 1530-1531, 1532, 1534;
accord, Laitos, supra n. 6, at 4-4 to 4-5.
134. E.g. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716 ("the right to pass on property-to one's
family in particular-has been part of the Anglo American legal system since feudal
times"); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1980)
(Marshsall, J., concurring: "the constitutional term . . . 'property' do[es] not derive
[its] meaning solely from provisions of positive law . . . there are limits on
governmental authority to abolish 'core' common law rights"); Kaiser Aetna, 444
U.S. at 176, 179-180 ("we hold the 'right to exclude' so universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right, falls within the category of interests the
Government cannot take without compensation"); see also James Burling, Private
Property Rights and the Environment after Palazollo, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1,
34, 34 n. 203 (2002).
135. Laitos, supra n. 6, at 4-15, 4-15 n. 2; Thompson, supra n. 126, at
1525, 1525 n. 290.
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conception of property according to constitutional norms, affects the
scope of Takings Clause protection.
B. The Post Lucas Framework for Property Identification-
"Background Principles" of State Law in Takings Cases
Lucas announced, but did not explain, a threshold
requirement to takings liability that "inhere[s] in the title itself'
according to "background principles of the State's law of property
and nuisance." 36 Lucas' new rule replaced "noxious use logic" and
determines whether constitutionally protected property exists in the
first place, thereby circumventing any taking inquiry.137  With the
advent of Lucas, then, the identification of "background principles"
of state property law has taken on great significance in takings law.
Lucas suggests that "background principles" are limited to the
common law of nuisance while Justice Kennedy's concurrence and
Justice Stevens' dissent urged that property status be evaluated more
broadly pursuant to common law generally, along with statutory
law.138 The majority in Lucas indicated that legislation would not
qualify as "background principles" where it is "newly legislated or
decreed."1 39  However, it also recognized that "changed
circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously
permissible no longer so" with regard to property status.140  Lucas
136. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; see supra pt. I(C) (discussing background
principles of state law and the nuisance exception regarding protected property
interests following Lucas).
137. See e.g. Michael Blunmm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy:
the Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 321, 322, 325, 327, 330-331 (2005); Burling, supra n. 134, at 33.
138. Compare Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-1031 with id at 1035 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ("the common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the
exercise of regulatory power . . . The State should not be prevented from enacting
new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions"); Id. at 1068-1069
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's holding today effectively freezes the State's
common law, denying the legislature much of its traditional power to revise the law
governing the rights and uses of property").
139. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
140. Id at 1031 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 827 cmt. g
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did tie its background principles to the Roth "tradition . . . of
resort[ing] to existing rules or understandings . .. to define the range
of interests that qualify for protection as property under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments," thereby suggesting that state law controls
in ascertaining background principles.141
Subsequent to Lucas, Palazzolo criticized legislative
enactments morphing into background principles that limit or nullify
property status: "a regulation . . . is not transformed into a
background principle of the State's law by mere virtue of the passage
of title."1 42  On application, the Court rejected a Rhode Island
Supreme Court ruling allowing the state's coastal management
legislation, which had preceded the owner's title, to operate as a
background principle of state property law.143  The Court further
stated, "A regulation or common-law rule cannot be a background
principle for some owners but not for others." 44 This criticism is
consistent with the Court's admonition that changes in the law do not
automatically extinguish protection under the Takings Clause.
Otherwise, Monsanto's notice rule 45 would frustrate transferability
(1979)); see also e.g. Munn v. III., 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876) ("the great office of
statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to adopt
it to the changes of time and circumstances"); Cmmw. v. Parks, 30 N.E 174 (Mass.
1892) ("the legislature may change the common law as to nuisances ... although
by doing so it affects the use or value of property").
141. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
142. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629-630.
143. Id. at 626 (citing Palazzolo v. St., ex. rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 716
(R.I. 2000)), 627-628. On remand, the Rhode Island Superior Court found that
development of the tidal portion of the owner's property would constitute a public
nuisance and violated that state's version of the public trust doctrine. Palazzolo v.
R.I., 2005 WL 1645974, *14 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005). Accordingly,
"background principles" of Rhode Island real property law applied to the owner's
takings claim even though the state's coastal management legislation did not.
144. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630.
145. The notice rule states that a person acquiring property subject to a
pre-existing regulation is placed on notice, and assumes the risk, that the owner has
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of property interests.146 Palazzolo, however, qualified its criticism
as dicta: "We have no occasion to consider the precise circumstances
when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle
of state law or whether those circumstances are present here."14 7
The dissent in Tahoe-Sierra recognized that some land use
regulations might qualify as background principles.148 However, the
dissent urged that "a moratorium prohibiting all economic use for a
period of six years is not one of the longstanding, implied limitations
of state property law."149 Moreover, it acknowledged that "short-
term delays attendant to zoning and permit regimes are a
longstanding feature of state property law and form part of a
landowner's reasonable investment backed-expectations."o As an
example of regulations that "have the lineage" of several decades' of
enactment, the dissent cited New York City's zoning ordinance,
which was enacted in the early twentieth century.' 51
Following Lucas, state courts have decided that statutes
qualify as "background principles," and hence, the Supreme Court's
direction for an "antecedent inquiry" is not limited to the law of
nuisance, or even the common law for that matter.152 However, the
no constitutional protection against such regulation. See supra pt. I(D) (discussing
Monsanto's notice rule).
146. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627-628; see also supra pt. I(E)
(discussing Palazzolo and the effect of the notice rule on transferability of property
interests).
147. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 639. Palazzolo left open the possibility that a
statutory enactment would qualify as a background principle according to the
criteria set forth in Lucas. Id at 630 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030). The
Court's guidance, as in Lucas, was restricted to a "total taking" inquiry and did not
address the possibility of a statute qualifying as a background principle in the
absence of prohibiting all beneficial use. Id.
148. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 351-354.
149. Id. at 352.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Anderson's American Law of Zoning vol. 1, § 3.07
(Kenneth H. Young ed., rev. 4th ed., Clark Boardman Co. 1995)); see also Village
of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397 (first Supreme Court decision upholding the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance following a due process challenge on the
grounds that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power).
152. See e.g. City of Va. Beach v. Bell, 498 S.E.2d 414, 417, 419 (Va.
1998) (coastal dune law limited the purchaser's "bundle of rights" and qualified as
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decisions do not uniformly analyze whether the statute or regulation
is consistent with the common law, or "undertake a more exacting
study of state property law,"' 5 3 but instead find that enactment
without more results in a limitation on property title.' 54 Based on
their decisions, the Court of Federal Claims and Federal Circuit
appear divided on whether statutes and regulations qualify as
background principles to limit constitutionally protected property
interests.' 55
a proscribed use interest in the owner's title); Kim v. City of N.Y, 681 N.E.2d 312,
315-316 (N.Y. 1997) (municipal charter requiring owner to provide lateral support
for public road was deemed a background principle of state property law); Grant v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (S.C. 1995) (coastal tidelands law
prohibited fill on property and purchaser acquired title subject to this limitation);
Hunziker v. St., 519 N.W.2d 367, 370-371 (Iowa 1994) (statute which prohibited
disinterment of human remains constituted a background principle of property law
that inhered in the title of purchaser); see also e.g. Robert L. Glicksman, Making a
Nuisance of Takings Law, 3 Wash. U. J.L. & Policy 149, 169-182 (2000).
153. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 352 n. 4 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
154. See e.g. City of Va. Beach, 498 S.E.2d at 417, 419; Grant, 461 S.E.2d
at 391; Hunziker, 519 N.W.2d at 370-371 (all three concluding statutory
enactments, without more, qualified as Lucas background principles); see also
Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1251 ("What the Lucas opinion does not make
completely clear, but which most [state] courts since appear to have accepted, is
that 'newly legislated or decreed' restrictions on land use can also constitute
'background principles' of state law"), rev'don other grounds, 216 F.3d 764, 782
(9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 343.
155. Compare e.g. Maritrans, 342 F.3d at 1352-1353 (federal maritime
legislation did not constitute a background principle that eliminated single hulled
vessels as constitutionally protected property subject of retrofitting requirement for
double hulls); Presault v. U.S., 100 F.3d 1525, 1530, 1533, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (federal legislation regulating railroads, including "Rails to Trails Act,"
did not qualify as background principle thereby depriving owners of fee interest in
property subject to abandoned rights of way) with M & J Coal Co. v. U.S., 47 F.3d
1148, 1154-1155 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (mineral owner and holder of state permit to
mine still subject to federal surface mining legislation which qualified as a Lucas
background principle; federal statute codified constitutional police power
protection for public health and safety and implied nuisance exception); Reeves v.
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The usage of statutes and associated regulation as a
background principle of property law for the purpose of defeating
takings claims sounds like a recycling of Monsanto's notice rule.
Thus, instead of pre-existing land use regulations defeating a takings
claim according to the notice rule-whereby purchasers are denied
any investment-backed expectations-the same pre-existing
regulations now defeat a takings claim when these are denominated
background principles of state property law.1 56 Commentators are
divided as to whether Lucas' background principles should extend to
statutes that do not readily correspond to the common law as a basis
for limiting property interests in subsequently acquired titles.' 57
Given the limited guidance in Lucas, Palazzolo, and Tahoe-Sierra,
the debate on background principles focuses on particular topics,
such as the law of nuisance, the public trust doctrine, and the law of
custom applied to beach access.
U.S., 54 Fed. Cl. 652, 672 (2002) (federal surface management statute construed as
a background principle limiting mining claimant's subsequent entry and acquisition
of mineral rights on public land).
156. Compare supra nn. 54, 56 and accompanying text (discussing the
notice rule applied to pre-existing regulations to defeat takings claims) with supra
n. 152 and accompanying text (discussing background principles applied to pre-
existing regulations to defeat takings claims).
157. Compare Lynn Blais, Takings, Statutes and the Common Law:
Considering Inherent Limitations on Title, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 6-7, 22, 39-42, 55
(1996); Blumm & Ritchie, supra n.137, at 354-359 (advocating expansive
interpretation of background principles to encompass statutes and regulatory law)
with David L. Callies & David J. Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in
Takings Law: Background Principles, Custom and Public Trust "Exceptions" and
the (Mis) Use ofInvestment Backed Expectations, 36 Val. U. L. Rev. 339, 361-378
(2002); Burling, supra n. 134, at 517-529; Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory
Takings Quartet: Retreating from the "Rule ofLaw," 42 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 345,
383-386, 388-390, 398 (1988) (arguing for a narrower interpretation of
background principles tied to the common law); see also Christie Olsson, Takings
Law in the Aftermath of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Does the
Background Principles Exception Clarify or Complicate Regulatory Takings Law,
45 Santa Clara L. Rev. 707, 727, 731-732 (2005) (decisions applying background
principles to regulations appear to restate the common law).
[Vol. 32
ALASKA TAKINGS LAW
C. A Constitutional Role for Judicial Review ofBackground
Principles of State Property Law in Takings Cases
Currently, one of the most important questions in federal
takings law is who determines whether property qualifies for
constitutional protection.158 Based upon Roth, Lucas, and Palazollo,
the Supreme Court has indicated state legislatures and state courts
should play a decisive role in the determination of constitutionally
protected property. However, the Court has also signaled it may
review state determinations of constitutionally-protected property
according to Lucas' background principles. Still, the Court's
willingness to review such determinations may raise federalism
concerns due to Roth's enshrining of state property law.1 59
In Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari of a taking claim the Oregon Supreme Court had
rejected due to background principles.' 60 The Oregon Court ruled
coastal owners did not own the beach portion of their property
158. See e.g. John Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the
Takings Clause, 18 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 4 (1993); Laitos, supra n. 6, at § 5.04.
159. See Frank Michelman, Property, Federalism and Jurisprudence: A
Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 301, 302-
303, 305, 314, 318, 320 (1993). Following Justice Black, Professor Michelman
defines "Our Federalism" as the federal judiciary maintaining respect for the
competence and responsibility of state judiciaries, along with a posture of federal
judicial restraint. Id. at 302-303. However, Michelman believes that Lucas and
Justice Scalia's philosophy forebode federal supremacy in the determination of
constitutionally protected property under the Takings Clause. Id. at 313, 318, 320.
Michelman's suspicions may be allayed by the Court's most recent taking decision,
discussed infra at 28-30; see also Thompson, supra n. 126 at 1525 n. 290 ("any
normative view of property is likely to constrain and thus federalize property rights
to some degree").
160. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994) (Scalia &
O'Connor, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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according to that state's law of custom guaranteeing public access.
Instead, that Court concluded the law of custom qualified as a
background principle according to Lucas.162 Expressing concern for
potential abuse of Lucas' background principles of state property
law, Justices Scalia and O'Connor dissented from the denial of the
writ of certiorari, explaining: "a State may not deny rights protected
under the Federal Constitution . . . by invoking non-existent rules of
state substantive law."1 63
Further, the dissent stated, "[o]ur opinion in Lucas . . . would
be a nullity if anything that a state court chooses to denominate
'background law'-regardless of whether it is really such-could
eliminate property rights." 64  The dissent drew support from an
earlier decision, Hughes v. Washington, wherein Justice Stewart
agreed with the proposition that a state could not take property "by
the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has
taken has never existed at all."l 65
In 2009, the Supreme Court accepted review on a takings
challenge to a Florida Supreme Court decision regarding that Court's
determination of Florida common law.1 66  In Walton County,
161. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 460 (Or. 1993), cert.
denied (Mar. 21, 1994).
162. Id. at 456-457.
163. Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. at 1207. The dissent contended: (1) the
Oregon Court was creating a new doctrine rather than applying the common law of
custom; (2) Oregon's precedent on the subject was vacillating and therefore not
persuasive; and (3) an evidentiary record had not been developed to support a claim
of custom. Id. at nn. 4-5. For a critical review of Cannon Beach, see Callies &
Breemer, supra n. 157, at 351, 375-377.
164. Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. at 1207.
165. Id. (quoting Hughes v. Wash., 389 U.S. 290, 296-297 (1967)
(Stewart, J., concurring)). Hughes held that public land law rather than the
Washington Constitution controlled as to ownership of land accreted to a federal
patent, which had been conveyed prior to the State of Washington's admission to
the Union. Hughes, 389 U.S. at 291. Thus, Hughes was not decided as a taking,
see id., and Justice Stewart's concurrence on a taking theory was dictum. See id. at
296-297 (Stewart, J, concurring).
166. Walton Co. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102
(Fla. 2008), cert. granted sub. nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla.
Dept. ofEnvtl. Protec., 130 S.Ct. 2792, 2793 (June 15, 2009).
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oceanfront property owners claimed their littoral rights were
abrogated due to a government-sanctioned "erosion control line" that
replaced the mean high-water mark where beach replenishment had
occurred.167 This surveyed boundary vested the state with property
ownership seaward,168 and the owners contended that as a result, their
rights to future accretions and contact with the water were
abolished. 169 Despite two dissenting justices, the Florida Supreme
Court denied the owners' taking challenge.' 70
Among the issues the U.S. Supreme Court accepted for
review was whether the Florida Court invoked "nonexistent rules of
state substantive law" following Cannon Beach, such that its decision
could be viewed as a "judicial taking."' 7 1 The Supreme Court began
its analysis by acknowledging the State of Florida, as owner of the
beach seaward of the littoral property, had the right to fill its tidal and
submerged land in order to manage its coastal resource.172 It further
acknowledged that littoral owners had no right to dry land created
and contact with the water where avulsion had occurred.173  The
Court then held the beach renourishment to be an avulsive event
under Florida common law, and therefore, the Florida Supreme Court
167. Id. at 1108-1109. The legislation in question was the Beach and
Shoreline Preservation Act, codified at Fla. Stat. §§ 161.011-161.045 (2005).
168. Walton Co., 998 So.2d at 1108 (citing Fla. Stat. § 161.191(1)-(2))
169. Id. at 1115-1116.
170. Id. at 1109,1116,1121.
171. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla Dept. of Envtl Protec., 129
S.Ct. 2792 (2009) (grant of petition for certiorari).
172. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. 2592, 2611 (2010) (merits
decision). The Court qualified this right by stating the state could not engage in fill
that interfered with the littoral owners' rights nor that of the public generally. Id.
173. Id. at 2598. Avulsion is the sudden or perceptible loss or addition to
land by action of a waterbody. Id. In Florida, as at common law, title to dry land
created by avulsion belongs to the owner of the previously submerged land rather
than the upland owner. Id. at 2598-2599.
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had not extinguished a common law property right. 174
While Stop the Renourishment affirmed the Florida Supreme
Court's decision, the justices disagreed on whether a judicial taking
would be recognized under the Takings versus the Due Process
Clause and whether to articulate such a rule as dictum.' 7 5 Hence, the
decision is precedential only for the proposition that the Florida
Supreme Court correctly interpreted that state's common law of
property and that previously recognized property rights had not been
abolished. Nonetheless, Stop the Renourishment may impart that the
Court will continue to monitor state court precedent, consistent with
the dissent in Cannon Beach and the concurrence in Hughes, for
compliance with the Takings Clause, despite a lack of consensus on
the judicial taking theory. 176
D. The Alaska Supreme Court's Analysis of Protected Property and
Lucas Background Principles
The Alaska Supreme Court has addressed the question of
constitutionally protected property in a number of takings decisions;
however, it has not expressly considered Lucas' "background
principles" in evaluating whether changes in positive law may
abrogate or eliminate property interests.' 77  Still, in four decisions
174. Id. at 2611-2613.
175. Compare id. at 2601-2602 (Scalia, J., plurality); Id. at 2613 (Kennedy
& Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part) with id at 2618 (Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ.,
concurring in part). As presented in the case, the judicial taking issue was whether
a court decision, as distinguished from legislative or regulatory action, eliminated a
previously recognized property right. Id at 2601-2602.
176. See Vandevere v. Lloyd, _ F.3d _, No. 09-35957, slip op. at 9228
n.4, (9th Cir. July 11, 2011) ("a federal court remains free to conclude that a state
supreme court's definition of a property right really amounts to a subterfuge"). For
commentary on judicial takings, see W. David Sarrat, Judicial Takings and the
Course Pursued, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1487 (2004); Roderick Walston, The Constitution
and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings and Judicial Takings, 2001 Utah
L. Rev. 379 (2001); Thompson, supra n. 126.
177. See e.g. Hageland, 210 P.3d at 449; Anderson, 78 P.3d at 714-716
(Alaska 2002) (dispositional); St. Dept. of Nat. Resources v. Arctic Slope Regl.
Corp., 834 P.2d 134, 138 (Alaska 1991); cf Vanek v. St. Bd. of Fisheries, 193 P.3d
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concerning the constitutionality of 1997 tort-reform legislation, the
Court has taken a similar approach in ascertaining whether punitive
damage claims would be protected after the Legislature changed the
law.' 78  Through dispositional opinions in the first two cases and
ratified by a majority in the third and fourth cases, the Court rejected
taking challenges to a 1997 statute that allocates 50% of a punitive
damage award to the State on the theory the claimants lacked a
constitutionally-protected property interest. 79 The 1997 tort-reform
legislation is commonly known in the literature as a "split-recovery"
statute.' 80
Evans was the first decision to address a taking challenge to
the 1997 legislation. Plaintiffs in that case alleged tort claims that
had not yet been adjudicated but whose underlying events had
apparently occurred prior to enactment.' 8 ' The dispositional opinion,
283, 292 (Alaska 2008) (mentions "background principles of state law" in passing
without identifying Lucas or engaging in a Lucas inquiry).
178. See Alaska v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 67-68 (Alaska 2007); Reust v.
Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc., 127 P.3d 807, 82 (Alaska 2005); Id at 826
(Bryner, C.J., dissenting); Anderson, 78 P.3d at 714-716 (dispositional); Id. at 723
(Bryner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Evans ex. rel. Kutch v.
Alaska, 56 P.3d 1046, 1058 n.74 (Alaska 2002) (dispositional); Id. at 1075-1079
(Bryner, J., dissenting). The 1997 legislation raised a number of constitutional
challenges aside from takings that are not considered here.
179. Id The challenged legislation is codified at Alaska Stat. §
09.17.0200), and was enacted as part of 1997 tort reform legislation. See Ch. 26, §
10, SLA 1997. The disputed provision states: "[i]f a person receives an award of
punitive damages, the court shall require that 50 percent of the award be deposited
into the general fund of the state."
180. The term "split-recovery" statute refers to state legislation that
allocates a portion of punitive damages awarded in a private action to a designated
public fund. At least 12 states have adopted such legislation through the year 2000.
See Scott Dodson, Note, Assessing the Practicality and Constitutionality of
Alaska's Split-recovery Punitive Damages Statute, 49 Duke L. J. 1335, 1336 n. 12
(2000) (collecting statutes).
181. See Evans, 56 P.3d at 1048 (plaintiffs described as "all injured parties
contemplating tort actions" and "all allegedly injured persons who have filed or
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delivered by a divided Court, ruled the 1997 legislation did not
constitute a taking because it was "construed as a cap on punitive
damages, limiting them before they are awarded to successful
plaintiffs, [and therefore] no constitutional problem exists." 82 The
Evans dissent reasoned the statutory limitation applied to punitive
damage awards and hence, the provision referred to a fully
adjudicated and liquidated chose in action for which protected
property status applies.'8 3
In Anderson and subsequent cases, the injuries for which the
plaintiffs sought punitive damages arose subsequent to the 1997
enactment.184  The dispositional opinion by a divided court in
Anderson invoked a rationale for rejecting the taking challenge
beyond that stated in Evans: "unlitigated claims only become
property when they accrue, and a claim cannot accrue before the
events that give rise to it occur."18 5 Since the punitive damage claim
in Anderson accrued after the effective date of the 1997 legislation,
the Court concluded plaintiffs had no constitutionally-protected
property interest. 8 6  The dissent to Anderson reiterated the earlier
dissent to Evans.187
Though not articulated, the four Alaska Supreme Court
decisions are consistent with the views of other courts,'88 as well as
commentators regarding the constitutionality of split-recovery
plan to file tort actions").
182. Id. at 1058 (emphasis in original).
183. Id. at 1076-77. The dissent also argued the statutory forfeiture of
50% of a punitive damage award took someone's property, otherwise the State
acquired no property interest for deposit into the general fund. Id. at 1077-1078.
Evans' dispositional opinion failed to address this critique. See id at 1058.
184. Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 68; Reust, 127 P.3d at 823; Anderson, 78 P.3d
at 714.
185. Anderson, 78 P.3d at 714.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 723 (Bryner, J., dissenting).
188. See e.g. Enquist v. Or. Dept. ofAgric., 478 F.3d 985, 1001-1005 (9th
Cir. 2007); Cheathem v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467, 474-475 (Ind. 2003); DeMendoza
v. Huffmann, 51 P.3d 1232, 1245-1247, 1246 n.14 (Or. 2002); Mack Trucks, Inc. v.
Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993); Gordon v. Fla., 608 So.2d 800, 801-802
(Fla. 1992) (per curiam).
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statutes against takings challenges.189 According to these authorities,
punitive damages are a recognized element of the common law,190
and as a chose in action, persons may claim a property interest in
such causes of action at least for due process purposes.191 However,
the common law also recognizes that the purposes served by punitive
damages are punishment and deterrence of prohibited conduct rather
than compensation to injured plaintiffs. 192
Due to these societal objectives and the discretionary nature
of punitive damages,193 the courts have characterized the property
status of punitive damages as a contingent rather than vested interest
under the Takings Clause.194  Furthermore, since punitive damages
189. See e.g. Michael J. Klaben, Split-recovery Statutes: the Interplay of
the Takings and Excessive Fines Clauses, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 104 (1994); Charles
F.G. Parkinson, A Shift in the Windfall: An Analysis of Indiana's Punitive Damage
Statute and the Recovery ofAttorney's Fees under the Particular Services Clause,
32 Val. U. L. Rev. 923 (1998); Dodson, supra n. 180, at 1336 n. 12.
190. E.g. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring); DeMendoza, 51 P.3d at 1239-1241 (reviewing nineteenth
century treatises on the subject prior to Oregon's admission into the Union).
191. E.g. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)
(quoting Mullane v. C. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950));
accord e.g. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Legal Claims as Private Property: Implications
for Eminent Domain, 36 Hast. Const. L.Q. 373, 373-377 (2009); see also Bush v.
Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Alaska 1973) ("a chose in action ... is a form of
property").
192. E.g. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) (1979); see also Chizmar v. Mackie, 896
P.2d 196, 209 (Alaska 1995) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Weiford,
831 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Alaska 1992)).
193. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983); Nissen v. Hobbs, 417 P.2d
250, 251 (Alaska 1966) (punitive damages are within the discretion of the trier of
fact); see also Alaska Stat. § 09.17.020(b) ("The fact finder may make an award of
punitive damages only if the plaintiff proves" certain conduct by the defendant)
(emphasis added).
194. See e.g. Enquist, 478 F.3d at 1004 ("plaintiffs interest in punitive
damages is even more contingent and uncertain than her interest in a tort cause of
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are part of the common law, both the legislative and judicial branches
of state governments have inherent authority to alter the rules on
punitive damages 95 or abolish them altogether, as the Washington
Supreme Court has done.' 96  For these reasons, courts have
determined punitive damage claims do not qualify as constitutionally
protected property and accordingly, have upheld split-recovery
statutes against takings challenges where the legislation severs a
portion of the punitive damage award prior to entry of judgment.19 7
The rationale behind these decisions distinguishes Penn
Central expectations protected under the Takings Clause and leads to
the conclusion that punitive damage claimants lack such expectations
for the reasons stated above, especially where the legislation is
enacted before the cause of action existed.198 By comparison, some
jurisdictions have interpreted punitive damage claims as fully vested
property interests deserving of constitutional protection so long as
they were reduced to judgment and awarded prior to statutory
abrogation.199
action"). Reviewing litigation challenging split-recovery statutes, Enquist noted
"[t]he state supreme courts concluded that a plaintiff has no vested right in punitive
damages." Id. at 1005. See also Anderson, 78 P.3d at 714 (concluding "Anderson
has no vested right in a punitive damages award"); Cheatham, 789 N.E.2d at 471-
472.
195. E.g. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("State legislatures
and courts have the power to restrict or abolish the common-law practice of
punitive damages," citing, e.g. Alaska Stat. § 07.17.020); see also Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 n. 32 (1978) ("the Constitution
does not forbid the creation of a new right, or the abolition of old ones recognized
by the common law, to allow a permissible legislative object"). Both Haslip and
Duke Power were due process rather than takings cases.
196. Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 919 P.2d 589, 590 (Wash. 1991)
(describing the Court's "long standing rule prohibiting punitive damages without
express legislative authorization").
197. See supra n. 194 (citing cases).
198. Enquist, 478 F.3d. at 1003-1004 (invoking the Penn Central
investment expectations factor to "conclude plaintiffs interest in a prospective
punitive damages award does not qualify as 'property' under the Takings Clause");
see also Anderson, 78 P.3d at 714-715 (plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of
full punitive damage award since Alaska's split-recovery statute was enacted
before her claim accrued).
199. See Smith v. Price Dev. Co., 125 P.3d 945, 949-50 (Utah 2005); Kirk
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Interestingly, neither the courts nor commentators have
applied Lucas' background principles in determining the
constitutionality of split-recovery statutes against takings
challenges.200 Yet the analysis here suggests such legislation would
qualify as an inherent limitation on state property titles under Lucas
because Roth's "existing rules and understandings" incorporates the
common law, the evolution of tort reform, and the precedent among
jurisdictions sustaining the constitutionality of split-recovery statutes.
Subsequent to the split-recovery litigation, the Alaska
Supreme Court in Hageland Aviation Services, Inc. v. Harms ruled
that a cause of action qualified as property for takings purposes even
though the claim had not been reduced to judgment. 20 1 Hageland
held employee overtime compensation claims accrued as causes of
action to qualify as a vested interest against retroactive legislation
that would have extinguished the claims.202 The Court reasoned that
"unlitigated causes of action become property when they accrue" and
relied on Alaska precedent that analogized accrual to the ripening of
a vested right.2 03 In comparison to the constitutional challenges to
v. Denver Publg. Co., 818 P.2d 262, 266-267 (Colo. 1991).
200. See supra nn. 188-99; see also Bethany Rabe, The Constitutionality
of Split-recovery Punitive Damage Statutes: Good Policy but Bad Law, 2008 Utah
L. Rev. 333; Victor S. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Cory Silverman, I'll Take
That: Legal and Public Policy Problems Raised by Statutes that Require Punitive
Damage Awards to be Shared with the State, 68 Mo. L. Rev. 525 (2003).
201. Hageland Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Harms, 210 P.3d 444, 449 (Alaska
2009).
202. Id. Hageland was an employee class action lawsuit brought under
Alaska's Wage & Hour Act contending that pilots were not exempt employees. Id.
at 446. The superior court ruled in plaintiffs' favor as to the employer's liability.
Id. at 446-447. While the suit was pending, the Legislature enacted a bill that
retroactively exempted the pilots from coverage under the Act, thereby
extinguishing their compensation claims. Id. at 447. Plaintiffs then alleged a
takings claim and prevailed. Id. at 447, 449-451.
203. Hageland, 210 P.3d at 449 (discussing Bidwell v. Scheele, 355 P.2d
584, 586 n. 5 (Alaska 1960), wherein a general savings statute was construed to
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the 1997 tort reform legislation, the Hageland plaintiffs' causes of
action had been, with the exception of damages, favorably
adjudicated before the Alaska Legislature retroactively changed the
substantive law.204
Hageland's reasoning regarding the property status of choses
in action appears to be inconsistent with other court decisions for
three primary reasons. First, the Alaska Supreme Court has
recognized "the term 'vested rights' is conclusory," "unhelpful" and
66 ,205
especially problematic . . . as a determinant of retrospectivity.
Consequently, Hageland's reliance on vested rights may be over-
broad in evaluating takings protection. 206 By comparison, principles
of retroactivity may provide a more meaningful assessment of due
process or taking protection for asserted property interests subject to
retrospective legislation.207 In Landgraf v. US! Film Products, the
Court noted that James Madison argued against retroactive legislation
preserve a statutory cause of action that arose before repeal of the legislation).
Bidwell held the cause of action had accrued and became a vested right. 355 P.2d at
587.
204. Hageland, 210 P.3d at 446, 450 ("the pilots' recovery was certain
when Chapter 19 was enacted [because] Hageland had already been found liable
for the pilots' unpaid overtime").
205. Norton v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 695 P.2d 1090, 1092-
1093, 1093 n. 5 (Alaska 1985) (citing Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court
and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696
(1960)).
206. The vested rights doctrine was developed in the nineteenth century to
protect established property and contract rights against new police powers. In the
early decades of the twentieth century, the distinction between vested rights and
expectancies was sharply criticized. Merrill, supra n. 119, at 922, 922 n. 153, 961
n. 282. Later in the twentieth century, vested rights became subordinated to the
Court's expansive interpretation of the Due Process, Contract, and Takings
Clauses. Laitos, supra n. 6, at § 3.02. The vested rights doctrine still exists in
constitutional law, but it now typically incorporates equitable estoppel against
governmental action. Id. See also Eagle, supra n. 6, at §§ 7-1(b), 7-1(f)-(j)
(discussing vested rights).
207. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 528-529; see also James L. Kainen, Historical
Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property and Contract
Rights, 79 Cornell. L. Rev. 87, 103-105, 112-114 (1994); Symposium, When Does
Retroactivity Cross the Line? Winstar, Eastern Enterprises and Beyond, 51 Ala. L.
Rev. 933 (2000); Ann Woolhander, Public Rights, Private Rights and Statutory
Retroactivity, 94 Geo. L. J. 1015 (2006).
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that allows "the powerful to obtain special and improper legislative
benefits." 208  Applying this principle, Hageland's retroactive
legislation was targeted at eliminating the employees' class action
after liability had been established; such invidious treatment through
retroactive legislation may explain the court's disposition,
notwithstanding that a general statement of legislative purpose had
been presented.209
Second, Hageland is subject to criticism for failing to address
the well settled federal rule that choses in action do not conclusively
vest as constitutionally protected property for either due process or
takings purposes until a final, unreviewable judgment is entered.210
While a chose in action has provisional property status pendente lite,
the law applicable to a pending claim may be altered, and the court
must apply the law in effect at the time of final decision rather than
prior law on which the claim was predicated. 2 11 Accordingly, a
208. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 267 n. 20 (1994)
(discussing Madison's reasoning in The Federalist No. 44 at 301 (J. Cooke ed.
1961)).
209. Hageland, 210 P.2d at 450 ("The avowed purpose of Chapter 19 was
to eliminate the pilots' claims along with the claims of two other class actions
against Alaska air carriers"). The Chapter 19 legislation did include a legislative
purpose of "retroactively removing flight crews from the scope of statutory
overtime compensation required under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act." Id;
Appellant's Excerpts of Rec., vol. I at 131 (Alaska Sen. Bill 105, Sponsor State.
(Feb. 14, 2005)).
210. See e.g. In re Consol. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982, 989
(9th Cir. 1987) (tort actions brought against government contractors were
superseded by retroactive legislation imposing FTCA as exclusive forum; this
legislation neither constituted a taking nor resulted in a violation of due process),
cert. denied sub nom. Konizeski v. Livermore Labs, 485 U.S. 905 (1988); Ileto v.
Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1139-1142 (9th Cir. 2009) (common law tort claims
against gun manufacturers superseded by retroactive legislation barring pending
claims; this legislation upheld against separation of powers, due process and taking
challenges).
211. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 212 (1995) ("when a
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chose in action may lose its protected property status if retroactive
legislation abrogates or eliminates the property status before a final
judgment is entered. The employer-appellants in Hageland advanced
this argument. 2 12 The pilot-appellees relied on Anderson's analysis
of choses in action and contended its rule on accrual before entry of
judgment controlled over the adverse federal authority.213 Hageland
declined to address the federal authority on retroactive legislation
applied to claims pendente lite.2 14
Third, Hageland and Anderson may be inconsistent with
Evans in determining when choses in action acquire property status
for takings protection. Hageland and Anderson indicate that choses
in action will acquire property status when they accrue. Evans
suggests its claims had accrued prior to the tort reform legislation, 215
and therefore, the accrued claims should qualify as constitutionally
protected property. However, the dispositional opinion in Evans
indicates the retroactive legislation was constitutional because it
became effective prior to a punitive damage award rather than
accrual of the cause of action.216 If Hageland and Anderson are to be
reconciled with Evans, the Alaska Supreme Court is apparently of the
view that other choses in action vest differently from punitive
damage claims as property interests for taking purposes.
In State Department of Natural Resources v. Arctic Slope
Regional Corp., the Alaska Supreme Court followed the U.S.
Supreme Court in defining intangible commercial interests, such as
confidential business information and trade secrets, as
new law makes clear that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply it in
reviewing judgments still on appeal, and must alter the outcome accordingly");
U.S. v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801); accord e.g. Natl. Coalition to Save
Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Elramly v. INS, 131
F.3d 1284, 1285 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
212. Hageland, Br. of Appellants, 21-24 nf. 13-14 (filed Mar. 3, 2008).
Additionally, an opinion of the Alaska Attorney General found the Ch. 19
retroactive legislation to be constitutional according to the federal authority. Id.;
Appellant's Excerpts of Rec., vol. I, 62-64 (reproducing 2005 Inf. Op. Atty. Gen.,
6-8 (May 2; 883-05-0016))
213. Id., Br. of Appellees at 16.
214. Hageland, 210 P.3d at 449-450.
215. See Evans, 56 P.3d at 1048.
216. Id. at 1058.
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constitutionally protected property.217 The Alaska Court quoted with
approval Monsanto's "notion of 'property' that extends beyond land
and tangible goods and includes the products of an individual's
'labour and invention."'218 Arctic Slope went on to declare: "By
protecting all persons' 'enjoyment of the rewards of their own
industry,' the Alaska Constitution adopts this Blackstone/Locke
theory of property." 2 19  On application, the Court ruled that a
company's confidential drilling records generated on an oil and gas
exploration qualified as property for purposes of a takings claim
against compulsory disclosure to either the State Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) or the public. 220 It ruled separately that
DNR had authority to use the confidential information internally
without a taking; however, the Court did not reach the issue of
whether compulsory records disclosure to the public would actually
result in a taking.221
DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court is perhaps the first case
wherein the Alaska Supreme Court evaluated the presence of a
property interest under the Alaska versus the Federal Constitution for
222takings purposes. In DeLisio, an attorney objected to his
compulsory appointment for criminal representation, contending his
labor qualified as property, and the appointment amounted to a taking
under both the Alaska and U.S. Constitutions. 223  The Alaska
Supreme Court agreed that a taking had occurred under the Alaska
217. St. Dept. ofNat. Resources v. Arctic Slope Regl. Corp., 834 P.2d 134,
138 (Alaska 1991).
218. Id. at 138 (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1002-1003 (citing William
Blackstone, Blackstone Commentaries vol. 2, 405; John Locke, The Second
Treatise of Civil Government ch. 5 (J. Gough ed., Blackwell 1947)).
219. Idat 138.
220. Id. at 136, 138.
221. Id at 140-142, 144 n. 11.
222. DeLisio v. Alaska Super. Ct., 740 P.2d 437, 438 (Alaska 1987).
223. Id at 438.
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Constitution.224 DeLisio acknowledged the great weight of authority
denied such a taking and that the attorney's argument might not have
merit under the Federal Constitution. 225 In fact, DeLisio overruled
two prior decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court that denied such a
taking claim. 226
Fundamental to DeLisio was whether the asserted property
interest concerned the practice of law or a person's labor.227
Following state precedent, DeLisio stated "it has long been
recognized that '[l]abor is property"' and ruled personal services
should not be excluded from the Alaska Constitution's takings
clause.228 However, the Alaska Court acknowledged the
"longstanding tradition" of an attorney being an officer of the
court.2 29 Still, DeLisio discounted this significance by finding "this
practice is neither as traditional nor as venerable as had been
previously supposed" and "tradition alone, regardless of its
venerability, cannot validate an otherwise unconstitutional
practice. DeLisio's rejection of a "longstanding tradition"
suggests a critical treatment of Lucas' "background principles" and
Roth's "existing rules and understandings" in evaluating the presence
of constitutional property interests under Alaska's taking clause.231
III. THE ALASKA COURT'S PER SE TAKINGS ANALYSIS
The Alaska Supreme Court has adopted Lucas' test for per se
takings pertaining to either a prohibition on all economic use or
224. Id at 438, 442-443.
225. Id. at 440.
226. Id. at 439, overruling, Wood v. Super.Ct., 690 P.2d 1225, 1229
(Alaska 1984) and Jackson v. Alaska, 413 P.2d 488, 490 (Alaska 1966)).
227. Id. at 440-442.
228. DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 440 (quoting Coffeyville Vitrifled Brick & Tile v.
Perry, 76 P. 848 (Kan. 1904)).
229. Id. at 441.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 441-442 (reviewing American precedent and comparing
English common law on attorneys as officers of the court).
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physical invasion of property.232 Since Lucas was decided, the Court
233has applied the "total taking" test in several cases. In all but one of
these cases, the Court rejected the taking claims under the total taking
test.234 Prior to Lucas, the Court held a taking occurred in several
cases that appear to be consistent with Loretto's rule on physical
invasion.235 However, the Court's post-Lucas precedent has not
clarified whether these earlier decisions sound as Lucas per se
takings. 236 The combination of these results leaves some questions
regarding the Court's interpretation of the Lucas per se takings tests.
A. Per Se Taking through Denial ofAll Economically
Beneficial Use of Property
In cases alleging a Lucas total taking, the Alaska Supreme
Court has expressed difficulty evaluating the claim due to a lack of
evidence regarding deprivation of all beneficial use of property.237 In
232. Anchorage v. Sandberg, 861 P.2d 554, 557 (Alaska 1993); see also
e.g., Cannone v. Noey, 867 P.2d 797, 800 (Alaska 1994) (citing Sandberg 861 P.2d
at 557).
233. See Spinell Homes v. Mun. of Anchorage, 78 P.3d 692, 702 (Alaska
2003); Balough v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 995 P.2d 245, 266 (Alaska 2000);
Tlingit-Haida, 15 P.3d at 765; Beluga Mining Co. v. St. Dept. of Nat. Resources,
973 P.2d 570, 575 (Alaska 1999); Cannone, 867 P.2d at 801; Sandberg, 861 P.2d
at 557 n.7.
234. Tlingit-Haida, 15 P.3d at 765 (recognizing a Lucas per se taking for a
public utility's "stranded facility" due to regulatory action).
235. See Bakke, 744 P.2d at 657 (dictum); DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 442-443;
Doyle, 735 P.2d at 735; Grant, 560 P.2d at 39; Wernberg, 516 P.2d at 1200-1201.
236. See City of Kenai, 860 P.2d at 1238 (taking can occur by physical
invasion without explanation to pre-Lucas Alaska precedent); Arctic Slope, 834
P.2d at 142 (discussing federal precedent for a taking by physical invasion but not
reviewing Alaska decisions); Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 557 n. 7 (dictum: a per se
taking by physical invasion amounts to an appropriation of property).
237. See Spinell, 78 P.3d at 702 ("Spinell makes no effort to show that the
value of its land was at all altered by the municipality's actions"); Balough, 995
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this regard, the Court has stated that the availability of an alternative
property use not pursued by the owner or evidence of marketability
despite the regulation will defeat a Lucas per se taking claim. 2 38 In
Zerbetz, the Alaska Supreme Court colorably misstated Lucas for the
proposition that a federal taking would not occur "unless the owner
has been deprived of all economically beneficial uses of his
property."239 Lucas recognized.that a per se taking is established if
the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial or
productive use; however, Lucas also recognized the principle of a
Penn Central taking for a diminution in value warranting
compensation. 24 0
In Tlingit-Haida, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the
superior court that a "de facto taking" had occurred when the former
Alaska Public Utility Commission (PUC) modified a utility's
certificate of authority.241 The Court furthermore "agree[d] with the
superior court that the modification is a per se taking for which
compensation is due." 242 The PUC action pertained to the Tlingit-
Haida Regional Electrical Authority (THREA), which provided
service to Klawock and other villages. The PUC decided the public
interest was better served by another utility providing electrical
service to Klawock.243 However, the PUC's order did not affect the
entirety of THREA's service area nor was its operating certificate
revoked altogether.244 Instead, "the commission's modification of
THREA's certificate had the effect of denying THREA the use of
P.2d at 266 (no evidence proffered to substantiate assertion that marketability of
property was impaired); Cannone, 867 P.2d at 801 (reversing superior court finding
of per se taking as "wholly unsupported by the record").
238. Balough, 995 P.2d at 266 n. 83; Cannone, 869 P.2d at 801.
239. Zerbetz v. Mun. of Anchorage, 856 P.2d 777, 782 n. 5 (Alaska 1993)
(citing Lucas).
240. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-1017 (per se taking rule); Id. at 1016 n. 7
(Penn Central rule). See also Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (citing Penn Central, the
Court stated that "where a regulation . . . fall[s] short of eliminating all
economically beneficial use, a taking may nonetheless have occurred").
241. Tlingit-Haida,15 P.3d at 764.
242. Id. at 765.
243. Id. at 759-761 (PUC Ords. nos. 9 and 19).
244. Id. at 765 ("the commission's action did strand some of THREA's
physical assets").
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property dedicated to providing Klawock with electrical service." 245
Tlingit-Haida made no finding that the utility's loss of service
amounted to a deprivation of all beneficial use of its property. 24 6 To
the contrary, the Court affirmed the PUC's finding that "THREA's
loss of Klawock [electrical service] would not jeopardize the utility's
financial well-being or the Rural Electrification Act loans that
Klawock's physical plant secured." 247  With this record, Tlingit-
Haida cannot be reconciled with the Court's denial of per se takings
in Spinell, Balough, and Cannone where economic property use
remained.248 Despite this significant disparity, Tlingit-Haida can be
explained as turning on public utility rather than takings law.249
Thus, both the PUC and the competing utility recognized that some
measure of compensation would be due THREA pursuant to Alaska
law concerning the PUC's authority to transfer assets as part of a
modification of a certificate of convenience. 250
Sandberg rejected a developer's claim of a per se taking
"because the municipality neither sought to appropriate SD&R's
245. Id.
246. See Tlingit-Haida, 15 P.3d at 764-765.
247. Id. at 760 (PUC finding), 764 (court deferred to PUC's review of
conflicting expert testimony as to economic impact of decertification).
248. Spinell, 78 P.3d at 702; Balough, 995 P.2d at 266; Cannone, 867 P.2d
at 801.
249. See Tlingit-Haida, 15 P.3d 754; Reply Br. of Cross Appellant Alaska
Power Co's, Tlingit-Haida Regl. Electr. Auth. v. Alaska, 13-14 ("The imposition of
stranded investment would be a taking for which the affected utility must be
allowed to obtain compensation equating with the used and useful remaining value
of its affected facilities"); see also William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak,
Stranded Costs, 18 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 835, 845-847 (1995); Eagle, supra n.
6, at § 1-6(d)(2) (discussing change in regulatory policy that results in confiscation
to utility investors and whether taking occurs).
250. Tlingit-Haida, 15 P.3d at 764; see also Alaska Pub. Util. Commn.'s
Reply Br. on Takings Issues 3, 5, 8; Alaska Power Co.'s Reply Br. on
Condemnation and Takings Issues 11, 13.
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property nor enacted a regulation constraining SD&R's use of its
property in any way." 25 1 Justice Compton dissented from the Court's
252
opinion. The dissent drew upon the superior court's finding that
the Municipality of Anchorage's "conduct made the development of
plaintiffs' property economically infeasible."253 The dissent argued
that the Municipality substantially interfered with the developer's
property use because "the interference resulted from the
municipality's program of acquiring park land and its efforts to
minimize costs associated with the acquisitions."254 The dissent
suggests, but does not explain, that the nature of the governmental
interference is immaterial if the result denies an owner all
25economically beneficial use of property.25 The dissent can also be
read to apply Armstrong's fairness principle that the developer was
singled out to bear disproportionate costs of a program benefitting the
public generally.256
B. Per Se Taking Through Physical Invasion or Appropriation
In a series of cases decided before Loretto and Lucas, the
Alaska Supreme Court held a taking occurred under the following
circumstances: destruction of an express easement, denial of littoral
access, imposition of a navigational easement, appropriation of labor,
or physical occupation of property. 257 Though the Alaska Court has
not subsequently classified this precedent as a per se taking following
251. Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 557 n. 7.
252. Id. at 561-565.
253. Id. at 561.
254. Id. at 563.
255. Id. at 562 n. 3.
256. See id at 562-563; see also supra pt. 1(H) (discussing Armstrong's
fairness principle).
257. See City of Kenai, 860 P.2d at 1239 (revocation and destruction of
express easement); Bakke, 744 P.2d at 657 (dictum-landslide from state logging
operation); DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 442-443 (appropriation of attorney's labor);
Doyle, 735 P.2d at 735 (navigational easement constructively imposed); Grant, 560
P.2d at 39 (destruction of littoral access); Wernberg, 516 P.2d at 1200-1201
(same).
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Lucas,2 58 federal takings law supports such a conclusion: the right to
exclude is deemed fundamental to property ownership and actions
depriving owners of their exclusive right of possession are
traditionally recognized as takings. 259 Thus, the destruction of a right
of access,260 the imposition of an easement through regulation,26' and
the permanent physical occupation of property regardless of
governmental purpose262 are all takings according to this rationale.
IV. THE ALASKA COURT'S CASE-SPECIFIC INQUIRY IN
PENN CENTRAL PARTIAL TAKINGS
Although Penn Central was decided in 1978, the Alaska
Supreme Court did not acknowledge Penn Central' s case-specific
approach until Arctic Slope in 1991.263 In the intervening period, the
Court decided takings cases according to Alaska precedent. 264
258. See e.g. Spinell, 78 P.3d at 702; R & Y, Inc. v. Mun. ofAnchorage, 34
P.3d 289, 293 (Alaska 2001); Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 557 (Alaska's post Lucas
decisions only mention physical appropriation as a form of per se taking without
elaboration or citation to precedent).
259. E.g. Laitos, supra n. 6, at § 11.03[A].
260. E.g. Wernberg, 516 P.2d at 1194-1197 (explaining rights of riparian
and littoral property owners and rule that public obstruction of the owner's right of
access when not in aid of navigation constitutes a taking; citing cases &
authorities).
261. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-832 (imposition of an easement as a
condition of regulatory entitlement was tantamount to physical occupation of
property, and therefore, a taking).
262. E.g. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428-430 (collecting cases holding fixture
installation or structure placement on property is tantamount to an ouster of
possession); see also U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261, 264 (1946) (frequent
aircraft overflights amounted to direct invasion of owner's property; held a taking).
263. Arctic Slope, 834 P.2d at 139 (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005
and citing Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 83); accord Hageland, 210 P.3d at 449 n. 13.
Monsanto and Pruneyard follow Penn Central.
264. See Ehrlander v. St. Dept. of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 797 P.2d 629,
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Following Arctic Slope and based upon Agins, Sandberg added a
fourth factor regarding "the legitimacy of the interest advanced by
the regulation." 265  While the Alaska Court has subsequently
described its case-specific inquiry as following the "Sandberg
factors," this approach is identical to Penn Central coupled with
Agins' substantially advances test.266
A. Character of the Governmental Action
As with federal takings law, the character of the governmental
action factor generally has not been decisive in most Alaska takings
cases. 267 While a few cases do emphasize this factor, drawing any
significance from this factor beyond the context of each decision
would be speculative.
Hageland applied the character of action factor in ruling that
retroactive legislation constituted a taking of employees' causes of
action for overtime compensation. 268 The Alaska Court rejected the
employer's contention that the legislation served a general economic
purpose in furtherance of the police power. 269  Hageland
distinguished companion legislation that was applied prospectively.
With regard to the challenged legislation that was expressly
retroactive, the Court stated that "[i]n carrying out the legislature's
narrow purpose to prevent litigation of these class actions, Chapter
19 effectively transferred money from the pockets of one private
632-633 (Alaska 1990); Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 791 P.2d
610, 614 (Alaska 1990); Bakke, 744 P.2d at 657; DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 439-440,
442-443; Doyle, 735 P.2d at 736-737. These Alaska decisions occasionally drew
on federal precedent but did not employ the Penn Central factors. See id
265. Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 557 (citing Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1000-
1005; Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-261).
266. See Spinell, 78 P.3d at 702; R & Y, 34 P.3d at 293 (describing
"Sandberg factors"); see also e.g. Beluga, 973 P.2d at 575; Cannone, 867 P.2d at
800 (describing factors and citing Sandberg).
267. See e.g. Balough, 995 P.2d at 266 ("[t]he [Borough] Assembly's
rezoning action was a legitimate government action, consistent with the [Fairbanks
North Star Borough]'s comprehensive zoning plan").
268. Hageland, 210 P.3d at 450.
269. Id.
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party to another." 270  Although not stated, Hageland's finding
suggests the retroactive legislation violated the public use
requirement of the Takings Clause that has been the subject of much
scrutiny following the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of
New London, Conn.271
Sandberg concerned a developer's challenge to the
Municipality of Anchorage's refusal to fund water, sewer, and road
improvements through assessment districts in which the Municipality
itself held title to several parcels.272 The Alaska Supreme Court held
the Municipality's actions "involved neither a physical invasion nor
even regulation concerning SD&R's use of its property.",273  The
Court described the situation as "a series of municipal decisions
which, indirectly, have rendered SD&R's development plans
economically infeasible." 2 74  With regard to the character of the
action, the Court stated that "the infringement on SD&R's property
rights is so unclear" and ruled that the other Penn Central factors
"must weigh heavily in SD&R's favor."275  Justice Compton
dissented in Sandberg and was persuaded that the Municipality's
actions substantially interfered with the owner's property, regardless
of the absence of regulatory action.276
The character of the action issue in R & Y was joint wetlands
270. Id.
271. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Kelo noted that
usage of the eminent domain power for purely private purposes, i.e. transfer of
property from one private owner to another, would not satisfy the "public use"
prong of the Takings Clause. Id. at 477 (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)); see generally Dwight H. Merriam & Mary
Massaron Ross, Eminent Domain Use and Abuse: Kelo in Context (2006).
272. Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 555-556.
273. Id. at 558, 559 (the Municipality "has never placed any restrictions on
SD&R's right to use and develop any portion of its property").
274. Id. at 558.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 562 n. 3 (Compton, J., dissenting).
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regulation by the Municipality and the Army Corps of Engineers. 2 77
At trial, the owners argued that joint governmental regulation should
not be a legal defense to liability and requested that the issue of joint
and several liability be decided.27 8 The superior court found "the
lion's share" of property regulation was attributable to the federal
government rather than the Municipality.279 Although declining to
rule on the matter, the trial court acknowledged the joint and several
liability issue and found this to be a matter of first impression.2 80 The
trial court instead followed Sandberg by finding "the MOA's conduct
regarding the land was 'mostly indirect."' 281  Due to this
complication in proving a taking, the trial court applied Sandberg in
requiring the investment expectations and economic impact to weigh
heavily in the owners' favor. 282 The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's application of Sandberg.283
The issue of joint governmental action in regulatory takings
law is a vexing one,284 due, inter alia, to limitations in state and
federal jurisdiction.285 A property owner subject to cumulative
regulatory burdens by different governments, in effect, is required to
277. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 291-292, 294.
278. Appellant's Br., R & Y, Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 29-33, 37-42.
The owners cited federal takings precedent on the issue of joint governmental
regulation including a U.S. Supreme Court decision that held a local government
liable for its involvement in a federally mandated program. Id. at 32, 32 n. 13, 41-
42 (citing, inter alia, Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1962)).
279. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 295 (quoting Memorandum Decision, R & Y, Inc. v.
Mun. ofAnchorage, 17).
280. Memorandum Decision, R & Y, Inc. v. Mun. ofAnchorage, 11.
281. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 294.
282. Id. at 296 n. 19 (citing Sandberg, 861 P.3d at 558).
283. Id. at 294.
284. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has stated in dictum, but not
expressly ruled, on the issue of joint and several liability as between two
governments allegedly causing a taking. See Ciampetti v. U.S., 18 Cl.Ct. 548, 556
(1989); City National Bank, 33 Fed.C1. at 231-232.; Good v. U.S., 39 Fed.Cl. 81,
105 (1997). At the time of R & Y, there did not appear to be any precedent on the
matter.
285. See e.g. Orion Corp. v. Wash., 747 P.2d 1062, 1070 (Wash. 1987)
(state taking action could not join federal government as party defendant, and
similarly, federal taking action could not join state government as party defendant).
[Vol. 32
ALASKA TAKINGS LAW
establish causation among the different regulators to work a taking. 286
Meanwhile, each defendant can deflect from taking causation by
contending the plaintiff failed to comply with another regulator or
that the regulator caused the taking.287 R & Y does not provide a
satisfactory solution to this problem where the regulatory impact is
bifurcated due to jurisdictional limitations. Property owners subject
to multiple government regulations would likely welcome a more
definitive ruling in takings law.
In Waiste v. State,288 the seizure of a vessel through an in rem
forfeiture action was held not to be "an exercise of the State's
constitutional taking power for which the Takings Clause triggers the
requirement of just compensation. Rather, that law is an exercise of
the State's police powers."289 Waiste followed well established law
that asset forfeitures reflect a traditional exercise of police power.290
If Waiste were analyzed through Penn Central, its health and safety
objective would weigh strongly with regard to the character of the
governmental action. 29 1 The vessel owner asserted lost profits from
temporary forfeiture, but the Alaska Court decided the police power
pre-empted any claim under Alaska's constitutional damage
clause.292
286. See e.g. Resource Invs., Inc. v. U. S., 85 Fed.C1. 447, 521-23 (2009)
(fact question as to causation of temporary taking as between federal versus state
and local permitting review precluded summary judgment; surveys federal
precedent on causation in takings cases).
287. See id.
288. Waiste v. Alaska, 10 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2000).
289. Id. at 1155.
290. See id. at 1155 n. 75 (citations omitted); Eagle, supra n. 6, at § 6.2
(regarding civil forfeiture law versus taking protection.)
291. See supra pt. I(H).
292. Waiste, 10 P.3d at 1154-1155.
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B. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
The Alaska Supreme Court's leading case regarding
investment-backed expectations is Arctic Slope. However,
Monsanto's early formulation of the notice rule in federal takings law
governed the context of that case and the rule of decision. 293
Subsequent to Monsanto, the notice rule in federal takings law has
evolved through both Lucas and Palazzolo, as explained above.294
The Alaska Supreme Court has yet to apply Palazzolo in a case
wherein a person has acquired property post-enactment and the
question is whether reasonable investment expectations are retained
notwithstanding the owner's notice of regulation.
Arctic Slope drew upon Monsanto's framework for
evaluating whether information submitted as part of a permitting and
registration scheme would be protected due to an "express promise or
guaranty" or, instead, whether the licensed companies were "on
notice of the manner in which EPA was authorized to use and
disclose any data turned over to it . . . ."295 In Arctic Slope,
companies had completed oil and gas exploration wells and were
required to submit confidential information to the State as a condition
296of permitting. Reviewing state regulations governing oil and gas
resources, the Alaska Court determined the exploration companies
had no "reasonable investment-backed expectations" that the State
would not use the confidential information for internal purposes.2 97
Arctic Slope presented several reasons for its conclusion. 298In
dictum, the decision suggests the State's disclosure of proprietary
information obtained through regulatory action to competitors or the
public results in a compensable taking.299
293. Supra pt. 1(D).
294. Supra pts. 1(C), I(E).
295. Arctic Slope, 834 P.2d at 139-140 (discussing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at
1005-1008, 1011, 1013).
296. Id. at 136 (citing Alaska Stat. §§ 31.05.026(e)-31.05.035(c) (2007)).
297. Id. at 140.
298. Id. at 140-144.
299. Id. at 144 (distinguishing Noranda Exploration, Inc., v. Ostrum, 335
N.W.2d 596, 604 n. 8 (Wis. 1983) and stating Noranda to hold "that public
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Sandberg followed Arctic Slope in ruling that a developer
lacked investment expectations with regard to the Municipality of
Anchorage's repudiation of a prior agreement to participate in
funding subdivision improvements.3 00 Sandberg cited Arctic Slope
for the proposition the Municipality had not provided an "express
promise or guaranty" regarding any commitment to fund road
construction despite prior balloting to participate in funding water
and sewer improvements. 30 1  Since the cost of the road alone
rendered the project economically infeasible, Sandberg reasoned the
developer could not fault the Municipality for subsequently acquiring
302
adjacent lots for park purposes which did not need a road. Further,
the Court found project feasibility "was always contingent upon the
agreement of other landowners in the area," and consequently,
"SD&R's acquisition of these lots and subsequent petitions for
improvement districts do not evidence reasonable investment backed
expectation, but rather, a business gamble." 303
In a dissent to Sandberg, Justice Compton contended the
court confused an owner's reasonable expectations with vested rights
regarding water and sewer improvements: "it makes no sense to
require expectations to become vested in order to be protected." 304
Having authored Arctic Slope, Justice Compton disagreed with the
majority's reliance on that opinion: "Arctic Slope requires that a
property owner's expectations be reasonable and investment backed,
not that the law 'guarantee' those expectations."305 Justice
Compton's dissent also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
the developer's investment expectations amounted to a "business
disclosure of data filed with the state geologist bore no reasonable relationship to
the purpose of informing agency decisions" (emphasis in original)).
300. Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 559-560.
301. Id. at 559 (citing Arctic Slope, 834 P.2d at 140).
302. Id. at 559-560.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 564 (Compton, J., dissenting).
305. Sandburg, 861 P.2d at 564 n. 6.
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gamble."306 The dissent took exception to the majority's insinuation
that the developer's investment was not bona fide or was required to
be risk free: "[u]ntil today there has been no requirement that
investment-backed expectations also be 100% guaranteed to warrant
protection." 307 The dispute in Sandberg illustrates the ambiguity and
varying application of Penn Central's investment expectations factor.
Other Alaska decisions briefly discuss investment
expectations in applying Sandberg's case-specific inquiry. In R & Y,
the Court held that the "[o]wners were able to realize most of their
investment backed expectations and have done so through the sale of
Subdivision property."308 In Balough, the Court rejected an owner's
investment expectations in a junkyard because no showing was made
that the land was purchased for investment purposes rather than as
interim use for subsequent development. 309 The only showing of
relevant investment was $17,000 to partially construct a fence
required by local zoning to shield the junkyard from surrounding
areas.3 10  In Hageland, the Court determined that reasonable
investment expectations are to be objectively rather than subjectively
evaluated, and thus the taking claimant's own expectations are not
-311dispositive.
In Beluga, the Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged that a
company had invested heavily, but held the company lacked
reasonable expectations because its mining claims were the subject of
litigation clouding the title, an injunction prohibited mineral
development without court approval, and the Alaska Statutes stated
that a locator's mineral title was subject to existing claims. 3 12 In
306. Id. at 565.
307. Id. at 565 n. 10.
308. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 296 (quoting trial court decision).
309. Balough, 995 P.2d at 266.
310. Id. at 249, 266.
311. Hageland, 210 P.3d at 451 n. 27 (following Chancellor Manor v.
U.S., 331 F.3d 891, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
312. Beluga, 973 P.2d at 574-576. The mining claimants' title to state
land was clouded by the mental health lands litigation in Alaska v. Weiss, 706 P.2d
781 (Alaska 1985). Due to breach of the trust grant, an injunction was issued in
Weiss barring the Alaska Department of Natural Resources from approving permits
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these circumstances, the Court stated that reasonable investors would
have recognized regulatory delays and project difficulties and
declined to confer takings protection for the expenditures made. 3 13
Beluga was a disastrous result for mining claimants who had invested
$1,800,000 and spent several years in an unsuccessful attempt to get
regulatory approval pending the Weiss mental health lands
litigation.314
C. The Economic Impact ofRegulation upon Property Owners
Alaska decisions applying case-specific inquiry for takings
have not consistently discussed or analyzed the economic-impact
factor. This lack of coverage may stem from a paucity of evidence
proffered on the issue. Thus, in some decisions, the Alaska Supreme
Court notes the takings claimant failed to show adverse affect on
property value, inability to market property, or loss of beneficial
use. 3 15 This finding, without more, disqualified the claimant from
on trust lands without the superior court's approval. Beluga, 973 P.2d at 575-576.
The Beluga claimants purported to have sought state approval but failed to
intervene in the injunction to pursue their permitting objective and instead
complained of onerous advocacy by the Weiss litigants. Id. at 573-576.
313. Beluga, 973 P.2d at 575-576.
314. Id. at 572-573, 575 (discussing Weiss); see also Compl., Beluga Min.
Co. v. State Dept. ofNat. Resources, 14. Beluga is critically examined in Susan
Reeves et al., Utilization, Development and Conservation ofNatural Resources for
the Maximum Benefit of Alaskans: Scrutinizing Alaska's Permitting Regime for
Large Mines, 26 Alaska L. Rev. 40, 41-43 (2009) (available at
www.law.duke.edu/joumals/alr).
315. See Spinell, 78 P.3d at 702 ("Spinell makes no effort to show that the
value of the land was altered by the Municipality's actions"); Balough, 955 P.2d at
266 (owner failed to show adverse economic impact from rezoning action; fencing
requirement applied regardless of zoning classification for property); Fairbanks N.
Star Bor. v. Lakeview Enterprises, Inc., 897 P.2d 47, 55 (Alaska 1995) ("Lakeview
offered no evidence of the value of these increased impacts [from adjacent
municipal landfill] and did not otherwise quantify any incremental impacts on the
value of its property").
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proving an economic impact necessary for the case specific inquiry
under Sandberg and Penn Central.316
According to Penn Central, the economic impact of a
governmental action is measured by diminution in property value. 3 17
However, this test is quite severe and almost always results in no
taking.3 18 The Alaska Supreme Court has stated that a diminution in
value is required for a taking to occur, but it has not specified what
incremental loss constitutes a diminution in value under the Alaska
Constitution. 319  R & Y noted that diminution in value is not
established where economic property use remains; while citing
federal precedent, the Court did not explain why imputed Penn
Central diminution in value is required for "damage" under the
Alaska Constitution. 320 Doyle recognized that a diminution in value
may be measured by a loss of appreciation rather than an absolute
reduction in property value due to the taking.32 1 Absent further
guidance and noting Doyle as an exception, the Alaska Supreme
Court's diminution in value test thus far appears to be
indistinguishable from the Penn Central test.
The Alaska Supreme Court has recited the "economic
advantages of ownership" in evaluating taking claims.322 However,
the Court has not explained what such advantages are-with one
exception: "the economic advantages incident to ownership of
unimproved property are the potential for appreciation and the
opportunity for development."32 Yet, the Alaska takings decisions
316. See Spinell, 78 P.3d at 702; Balough, 955 P.2d at 266; Fairbanks N.
Star Bor. v. Lakeview Enterprises, Inc., 897 P.2d 47, 55 (Alaska 1995).
317. Supra pt. 1(F).
318. Id.
319. Lakeview, 897 P.2d at 52 (citing Doyle, 735 P.2d at 738).
320. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 299 n. 45 (citations omitted).
321. Doyle, 735 P.2d at 737.
322. E.g. Lakeview, 897 P.2d at 52 ("A property owner may recover
damages for inverse condemnation where the state's activities deprive the owner of
the 'economic advantages of ownership"'); Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 558 ("[p]rivate
property is taken or damaged for constitutional purposes if the government
deprives the owner of the economic advantages of ownership"); Zerbetz, 856 P.2d
at 782; Homeward Bound, 791 P.2d at 614 n. 6.
323. E.g. Homeward Bound, 791 P.2d at 614 n. 6; accord Zerbetz, 856
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that mention "the economic advantages of ownership" have
324consistently resulted in no taking. As with the Court's recitation of
a diminution in value test, its "economic advantages of ownership"
test has thus far not resulted in any meaningful, enhanced protection
for regulated property owners beyond a Penn Central analysis.
Furthermore, analysis of Alaska taking cases indicates that
"economic advantages of ownership" are not unconditional and may
be subject to non-compensable regulation as illustrated in the
following contexts: loss of property income during a period of
possible acquisition;325 rezoning that does not permit a previous
nonconforming use;326 municipal siting of landfill that does not
impact property value within a ten year statute of limitations; 32 7
permitting delay or denial that prevents a specific development
project; 32 and a restrictive land use wherein the owner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies in permitting.329
P.2d at 782.
324. Lakeview, 897 P.2d at 52; Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 558; Zerbetz, 856
P.2d at 782; Homeward Bound, 791 P.2d at 614 n. 6.
325. See Joseph M Jackovich Revocable Trust v. St. Dept. Trans. & Pub.
Facilities, 54 P.3d 294, 297-298, 300 (Alaska 2002) (borough's intentions on
property acquisition not established; owners' commercial property still produced
"some income" despite loss of rents; proffer made on inability to sell property).
326. Balough, 995 P.2d at 265-266 (borough rezoning that excluded
junkyard nonconforming use did not impair marketability for other uses; rural
residential use of land still allowed).
327. Lakeview, 897 P.2d at 55 (jury verdict sustained on appeal that owner
failed to show loss in value due to borough landfill sited adjacent to property
during ten year statute of limitations period).
328. See Cannone, 867 P.2d at 801-802 (DEC rejection of several
wastewater disposal plans for rural subdivision found to be arbitrary and
capricious. Although Sandberg case-specific inquiry was not applied, the Court
found the owner's development options were not precluded).
329. Zerbetz, 856 P.2d at 783 (land use designation as "Conservation
Wetland," without more, did not affect property value upon showing that 26 out of
28 similarly regulated properties had been platted for subdivision approval; owner
had not tested the permitting process).
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A few Alaska decisions focus on the economic impact of the
challenged action in ascertaining a taking. In Hageland, the Court
ruled that employee claims for overtime compensation had accrued in
pending litigation. Retroactive legislation thereafter nullified the
claims, and this constituted a taking.33 0 Hageland did not apply a
Penn Central diminution in value test or otherwise compare the
claimants' economic loss in overtime compensation against their
regular compensation or other benefits.33 1 Instead, the Court found a
damage judgment of $1,600,000 to be a "substantial economic loss,"
without further analysis. 332  However, this finding is misleading
because it reflects a cumulative award for a class of 23 claimants.33
Hageland may be analogous to DeLisio where the appropriation of a
person's labor was held to be a taking without any analysis of
economic impact.3 34
In R & Y, the Court determined that a 20-foot setback
surrounding a pond resulted in a loss between 1.5 to 2% of total
property value for a subdivision.335 The Court described this as a
''relatively minor" rather than an "unduly burdensome economic
loss" and held no taking.336 The Court's holding excluded the
owner's loss in value attributable to the Corps of Engineers' separate
regulation of wetlands on the property, which was significant.337 R &
330. Hageland, 210 P.3d at 450.
331. Id. at 450-451.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 446 (identifying class of plaintiffs). The imputed average value
of loss for the class of pilots would be $69,565. However, the appellate record in
Hageland does not disclose how the damages were calculated. Still, an individual
sustaining a $70,000 loss to a protected property interest due to governmental
action has arguably been "damaged" according to a lay person's view; see Bruce A.
Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 116-117, 123, 129 (Yale U.
Press 1977) (suggesting a cultural and linguistic interpretation of the Takings
Clause according to common usage and lay persons' understanding).
334. DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 442-443.
335. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 294. Measuring this impact turned on segregating
the owners' loss in property value attributable to federal versus municipal authority
over wetlands regulation. Id. at 291, 294.
336. Id. at 300.
337. Id. at 293-294. At trial, the owners in R & Y contended joint exercise
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Y did not reconcile its finding of a "relatively minor" economic loss
with the Alaska Supreme Court's frequent representations of broader
protection under the damage clause to the Alaska Constitution. 338
The opinion seems to equivocate on the issue of economic impact by
noting a "minor economic loss may be indeed be compensable under
our takings doctrine," 339 while also stating "mere diminution in a
property's value, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a
taking" under federal law.340
In Doyle, the measure of economic impact upon property
owners was critical to establishing a taking. Doyle sounded in
constructive imposition of a navigational easement
due to aircraft overflights. 34 1 A group of homeowners contended the
rate of appreciation in their property value was lower than other
comparable properties not in the flight path of the Anchorage
International Airport. 342 The State contended an absolute diminution
in property value was required to prove damage under the Alaska
of police power between the Municipality of Anchorage and the Army Corps of
Engineers resulted in a 17 to 20% reduction in value for the total area of wetland
regulation. Id.; Pl.'s Trial Brief, R & Y, Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 41. To avoid
uncertainty in the untested context of joint and several taking liability, the owners
on appeal requested the court focus only on the Municipality's imposition of the
last 20 feet of setback in assessing economic impact. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 293-294.
338. Id. at 300 (citing Ehrlander, 797 P.2d at 633).
3 3 9. Id.
340. Id. at 298 n. 39 (quoting Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 604 (1993)). R & Y further justified its
result by erroneously describing the owners' taking claim based upon economic
impact alone without regard to the other Sandberg factors. R & Y, 210 P.3d at 294,
296, 298. However, the owners clearly applied all four Sandberg factors in arguing
for a taking or damage and did not rely on the economic impact factor alone. R &
Y, 34 P.3d 289; Appellant's Br., R & Y, Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 20-28, 50-57;
Appellant's Reply Br., R & Y, Inc. v. Mun. ofAnchorage, 10-15.
341. Doyle, 735 P.2d at 735 n. 3.
342. Id. at 734-735. The trial court found the annual rate of increase in
valuation for the subject properties was 13.7% whereas for comparable unaffected
properties the increase was about 16%. Id. at 738.
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Constitution. 343 Doyle rejected the State's argument and ruled "[a]
claim for loss of appreciation of property is compensable if it
represents value that would have been realized as of the date of
taking, if the taking had not occurred." 344 Based upon the evidence
reported in the opinion, the annual loss of appreciation in value was
approximately 2.3%.345 Interestingly, Doyle did not apply Penn
Central's diminution in value test in determining economic impact;
instead, the Court measured damage to property value directly
without regard to any legal standard as to sufficiency of impact.346
Further, Doyle conflates damage for proof of liability with damage
for proof of just compensation.347
The record regarding economic impact in R & Y and Doyle
appears commensurate, and yet, the Alaska Supreme Court reached
conflicting taking results. In both cases, the diminution attributable
to the governmental action was measured at a few percent of total
property value.348 Nonetheless in R & Y, the Court dismissed the
economic impact as legally insignificant, whereas in Doyle, the
commensurate economic impact warranted just compensation. The
disparate results in these two cases illustrate the arbitrary nature of
takings law due to the analytical categories of wetlands regulation
versus a constructive easement. If the disparate results can be
rationalized in federal takings law, it is that Doyle sounds in physical
invasion whereas R & Y sounds in regulatory interference, however
the Alaska Supreme Court has never reasoned that this distinction
controls for damage claims under the Alaska Constitution.
D. The Legitimacy ofInterest Advanced by Governmental Action
Alaska decisions prior to Lingle typically did not undertake
343. Id. at 735.
344. Id. at 737.
345. Id. at 738. The 2.3% annual loss of appreciation in value is imputed
from Doyle's findings that the impacted properties had appreciated 13.7% annually
whereas unimpacted properties appreciated 16% annually.
346. See id. at 736-739.
347. See id. at 735-737.
348. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 294; Doyle, 735 P.2d at 738-739.
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independent examination of legitimacy of the state interest advanced.
Where mentioned, this factor did not appear to affect the Sandberg
analysis under case-specific inquiry. 34 9 The dearth of meaningful
results for application of Agins' test in Alaska decisions, with few
exceptions, was shared in U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 350
Following Lingle, the Alaska Supreme Court has decided that Agins'
test for whether a governmental action legitimately advances a state
interest shall no longer be included in Sandberg case-specific
inquiry. 35 1 The Court has also adopted Lingle's inference that
legitimacy of the state interest be incorporated into the character of
the governmental action factor in case specific inquiry.3 52
E. Balancing of Sandberg Factors
In R & Y, the Alaska Supreme Court noted that "Alaska case
law does not elaborate on how the Sandberg factors are to be
weighed against each other." 353 R & Y then provided guidance on
balancing the Penn Central/Sandberg factors to the facts of the case.
In pertinent part, the Court decided against a taking by interpreting
Armstrong's fairness principle through Agins.354  The Court also
decided against a taking by applying Mahon's reciprocity of
advantage principle as developed by the Federal Circuit in Florida
Rock.5 However, R & Y's interpretation of Agins and Florida Rock
349. See Spinell, 78 P.3d at 702; R & Y, 34 P.3d at 293.
350. Supra pt. 1(G).
351. Hageland, 210 P.3d at 450 n. 21; see also Vanek, 193 P.3d at 293-
294 n. 64.
352. Hageland, 210 P.3d at 450 n. 21.
353. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 296.
354. Id. at 298-300; see also supra pt. I(H) (regarding Armstrong's
fairness principle).
355. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 299-300; see also supra pt. I(H) (regarding
Mahon's reciprocity of advantage principle).
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is flawed, and its imputed weighing of the Sandberg factors
according to these decisions is consequently defective.
According to R & Y, the Municipality of Anchorage's wetland
program was analogous to the residential zoning ordinance sustained
in Agins because the litigant was not the only owner burdened by the
regulation and because the burdened landowners would share the
benefits and burdens of the zoning regulation with other property
owners.356 However, Agins was a facial challenge to a zoning
ordinance, and the owner had not submitted any application to test
the regulatory process.357 Thus, there was no record in Agins
regarding the actual benefits versus burdens of the land use
regulation upon the community. 358
In the absence of any evidentiary record, Agins recited to state
and local legislative policies to evaluate the distribution of benefits
and burdens. 359 The Supreme Court then inferred that benefits and
burdens were shared because there was no finding that the zoning
regulation affected the subject property only. 360 This inference in
Agins is either speculation or a non-sequitur because the fact that a
regulation affects more than one property tells us nothing about the
distribution of benefits and burdens as to the other properties,
especially on a facial taking challenge. 36 1 Also, the analysis in Agins
was couched in terms of its "substantially advances" standard, which
was subsequently overruled in Lingle.362
Regarding Mahon's principle, R & Y purported to follow the
Federal Circuit's guidance in Florida Rock in determining whether a
reciprocity of advantage would apply to wetlands regulation of
356. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 298-299 (discussing Agins as "illustrative" of non-
compensable land use regulation).
357. Agins, 447 U.S. at 258, 259.
358. See id. at 258-260.
359. Id. at 261-262.
360. Id. at 262.
361. For further analysis of the circumstances in Agins and commentary
regarding Armstrong's fairness principle, see Sax, supra n. 107, at 162-163, 169-
170.
362. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-263.
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property.363 However, the Federal Circuit's guidance in Florida
Rock was not conclusive because the Court of Federal Claims on
remand subsequently found: "there can be no question Florida Rock
has been singled out to bear a much heavier burden than its neighbors
without reciprocal advantage.... The court finds that Florida Rock's
disproportionately heavy burden was not offset by any reciprocity of
advantage." 364 Thus, the decision in R & Y failed to explain that the
Federal Circuit's guidance actually resulted in finding no reciprocity
in a wetlands takings case.365
R & Y concluded that the property owners before the court
"incurred only relatively minor economic loss due to generally
applicable wetlands regulations which govern all land use in
Anchorage and benefit all landowners, including these
landowners." 366  Unfortunately, the Court made no finding on
whether the burdens of Anchorage's wetlands management program
were equitably distributed among all property owners. 367 Though R
& Y ruled "the owners were not singled out," no evidence was
proffered to support this finding. 368  To the contrary, the 1982
Anchorage Wetlands Management Plan indicates the R & Y owners
were part of a small percentage of properties subject to the
363. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 299 nn. 40-42 (discussing Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at
1570-1571).
364. Florida Rock, 45 Fed.Cl. at 37.
365. See R & Y, 32 P.3d at 299-300.
366. Id. at 300.
367. Id. at 299-300. The owners in R & Y contended both before the trial
court and the Alaska Supreme Court that they were disproportionately burdened
with Anchorage's wetland regulation, and the Municipality failed to respond to this
contention. Trial Br., R & Y, Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 37; Appellant's Br., R &
Y, Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 38 n. 15; Appellant's Reply Brief, R & Y, Inc. v.
Mun. ofAnchorage, 42.
368. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 300. The court did not consider the federally
regulated portion of wetlands and waters of the United States on the owners'
property in finding they were not singled out. Id. at 294.
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Preservation category that prohibited development, whereas most
owners were not regulated by the plan because their property
contained no wetlands.369 Professor Barros has commented that R &
Y's determination regarding reciprocity of advantage to be "complete
bunk:" "The regulations certainly create a public benefit to the
environment, but the burden.. . is imposed only on property owners
who have wetlands."370
V. IS THERE BROADER PROTECTION FROM DAMAGE
UNDER THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION?
The Alaska Supreme Court has regularly stated that the
damage clause in the Alaska Constitution provides broader protection
than available under the U.S. Constitution's Takings Clause. 37 1 The
Alaska Supreme Court has also regularly stated that Article I, Section
18 of the Alaska Constitution is to be liberally construed.372
However, the Court has never clearly applied the damage clause to
determine liability for regulatory interference with property rights.373
Nor has the Court articulated what "broader protection" means under
the Alaska Constitution for regulatory interference with property
rights in a manner noticeably different from federal takings
jurisprudence. 374 Thus far, the Court has not provided any exposition
of liberal construction by comparison to the Takings Clause,
especially with regard to regulatory interference with property. 375
This article has shown that the Alaska Supreme Court
typically follows federal takings precedent in construing Alaska's
369. Id.; Stip. Ex. 18, Anchorage Wetlands Mgt. Plan, Figure 6-4:
Wetlands Designations, Anchorage Bowl.
370. Barros, supra n. 80, at 354 n. 56 (quoting R & Y, 34 P.3d at 298).
371. E.g. Vanek, 193 P.3d at 291 n. 36; R & Y, 34 P.3d at 293 n. 11;
Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 557; Arctic Slope, 834 P.2d at 138; Doyle, 735 P.2d at 736.
372. E.g. Anderson, 78 P.3d at 714, 714 n. 16; Tlingit-Haida, 15 P.3d at
764; Zerbetz, 856 P.2d at 782; Ehrlander, 797 P.2d at 633.
373. See supra n. 5. Hageland and Tlingit-Haida qualify this conclusion
although these cases can be distinguished. Infra pt. V(A).
374. See supra n. 5
375. See id.
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constitutional article. 376 Thus, the Court has adopted Penn Central's
37 378
case specific inquiry,37 along with Lucas' per se liability rules.
Further, the Court has adopted Monsanto's notice rule as to
reasonable investment-backed expectations 379 and impliedly adopted
Lucas' background principles of state law in ascertaining whether
persons hold constitutionally protected property interests.380 The
Court has followed Lingle in deciding that Agins' legitimate state
interest test is no longer relevant under the Takings Clause. 38 1 The
Court has yet to apply Palazzolo's recognition of investment
expectations notwithstanding that ownership is acquired subsequent
to regulatory restrictions.382
A. Broader Protection from Regulation Versus Other Interference
with Property Rights under the Alaska Constitution
The Alaska Supreme Court has colorably applied the State's
taking or damage clause to find liability in situations of physical
invasion or appropriation of property. In Doyle, DeLisio, and Bakke,
the Court imposed liability according to Alaska rather than federal
constitutional precedent.383 Doyle concerned constructive imposition
of a navigational easement, which sounds in physical invasion rather
than regulatory interference with property. 3 84 DeLisio involved an
376. Supra pts. 1, III, IV.
377. E.g. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 296-297 n.21 (identifying source of Sandberg
factors as federal takings law); Arctic Slope, 834 P.2d at 139.
378. Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 557.
379. Arctic Slope, 834 P.2d at 139; Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 557.
380. See Vanek, 143 P.3d at 292; Anderson, 78 P.3d at 715.
381. Supra pt. 1(G).
382. Supra pt. I(E), IV(B).
383. Doyle, 735 P.2d at 735, 736 n. 3;DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 440, 442-443;
Bakke, 744 P.2d at 657.
384. Doyle, 735 P.2d at 735.
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attorney's compulsory rendering of court appointed legal services
and sounded in appropriation of the person's labor. 385 Bakke recited
California's constitutional article, which is identical to Alaska's, and
followed California precedent establishing liability for physical
invasion to property.386
Doyle, DeLisio, and Bakke do not clearly reflect broader
protection under the damage provision in Alaska's taking or damage
clause. Instead, these cases yield a result commensurate with a
Loretto physical invasion or appropriation of property under federal
takings law.387 Tahoe-Sierra made clear that federal takings law
differentiates between regulatory takings and taking by physical
invasion or appropriation. 3 Hageland suggests broader protection
of property rights due to retrospective legislation without any
analysis of diminution in value.389 However, Hageland also sounded
in appropriation of labor, and therefore, the case may not be
governed by regulatory takings law. 390  Tlingit-Haida involved
regulatory interference with a public utility, but public utility law
could control a "stranded facility" rather than takings law. 39 1
Therefore, the issue remains as to whether the Alaska Supreme Court
is willing to extend broader protection and liberal construction of the
Alaska Constitution to regulatory takings cases absent the above
distinguishable contexts.
The Alaska Supreme Court has evaluated damage for
purposes of rendering just compensation to property subject of
formal condemnation. However, damage for purposes of just
compensation is different from, and logically follows, liability
established for unconstitutional damage to property. 3 93  Thus, the
385. DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 442-443.
386. Bakke, 744 P.2d at 657 (citing Albers v. Co. of Los Angeles, 398 P.2d
129, 136-137 (Cal. 1965)).
387. See text accompanying supra nn. 257-262.
388. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321-324, 322 n. 17.
389. See Hageland, 210 P.3d at 450-451.
390. See id. at 444.
391. See Tlingit-Haida, 15 P.3d 754.
392. Infra pt. V(B).
393. See Alaska. Const. art 1, § 18.
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language of Alaska's constitutional article states the liability rule in
the disjunctive first, and then provides for just compensation:
"[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation." 394 According to canons of statutory of
construction, usage of the disjunctive in this text indicates that just
compensation shall be provided for taking or damage to private
property.3 95 Yet, the Alaska Supreme Court has not undertaken such
textual analysis.
The commentary on Article I, Section 18, of the Alaska
Constitution at the 1956 constitutional convention is terse: "These
words ['or damaged'] were added in recognition of the fact that
property may be damaged or made worthless as an incident of the
taking of other property for public use." 396  Accordingly, the
commentary states, "[i]t is our belief that the property owner should
be compensated for such injury." 397 This construction of Alaska's
damage clause is consistent with California's constitutional article, 398
although there appears to be no official statement of such intent in the
records of the 1956 constitutional convention. 399
394. Id (emphasis added).
395. See generally Norman Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and
Statutory Construction vol. IA § 21.14, 180-182 (7th ed., West 2009); Alaska v.
Andrews, 707 P.2d 900, 908 (Alaska 1986).
396. Alaska Const. Cony. Comm., Proposal 7, Commentary on the
Preamble and the Declaration of Rights, 6 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional
Convention 73 (1956) (re: draft Article I, Section 17 "Eminent Domain").
397. Id.
398. B.E. Witkin, Summary of California Law, vol. 8, § 1132 (10th ed.
2005) ("the words 'or damaged' were added in 1879 [to the California
Constitution] to make it clear that compensation is due when, because of a public
improvement, adjacent property is damaged, even though it was not taken") (citing
cases).
399. Supra n. 396; see also Alaska Const. Cony. Comm. on Article I,
Folders 203.3, 204 (microfilm at Alaska Law Library, Anchorage); Alaska Const.
Cony. Comm. on Preamble and Bill of Rights, Folder 205-Miscellaneous
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According to constitutional damage clause decisions from
400other jurisdictions, state courts generally acknowledge broader
protection in principle; nonetheless, the courts will rely on federal
precedent when interpreting claims of regulatory interference brought
under a state constitutional damage clause.40 1 The sampled precedent
does not clearly indicate that broader protection under state
constitutions will extend to regulatory interference as distinguished
from other constitutional infringements upon property rights.402 The
question may therefore remain open. No published literature appears
to exist on whether a state constitutional damage clause confers
broader protection for regulatory interference with property rights.403
Sandberg is the only decision of the Alaska Supreme Court
Materials, Folder 205.1-Minutes (microfilm at Alaska Law Library, Anchorage).
400. See Interstate Cos. v. City of Bloomington, 790 N.W.2d 409, 413
(Minn. Ct. App. 2010); KaJka v. Mont. Dept. of Fish, Wildlife, & Parks, 201 P.3d
8, 18 (Mont. 2007); Krier v. Dell Rapids Township, 709 N.W. 2d 841, 846-847
(S.D. 2006); Wild Rice River Ests., Inc., v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 850, 856
(N.D. 2005); San Remo Hotel v. S.F. City & Co., 41 P.3d 87, 100-101 (Cal. 2002);
Manufactured Housing Communities v. Wash., 13 P.3d 183, 187-188 nn. 7-8
(Wash. 2000).
401. See id
402. See San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 100-101 (state damage clause
construed "congruently" with Takings Clause; ordinance regulating rental housing
not a taking); Kajka, 201 P.3d at 18 (San Remo followed; no taking or damage for
legislated abrogation of licensed rights to game farms); Krier, 709 N.W. 2d at 847-
848 (state damage clause compensates for incidental and consequential injuries
peculiar to owners; no peculiar damage to owner due to road resurfacing); Wild
Rice River, 705 N.W.2d at 856-858 (state damage clause provides broader
protection but Tahoe Sierra and Palazzolo applied to find no damage for 21 month
building moratorium). Cf Interstate Cos, 790 N.W.2d at 413-415 (state damage
clause will compensate for regulatory interference that benefits public enterprises
whereas owner "suffer[s] a substantial and measurable decline in market value");
Manufactured Housing, 13 P.3d at 187-188 nn. 7-8 (dictum-state damage clause
may provide greater protection from regulatory interference upon proof of six part
test; clause not applied due to separate constitutional violation against private use).
Generalizing on the cited precedent is difficult absent a survey of state
constitutional damage clauses, and that endeavor is beyond the scope of this article.
403. Cf Richard L. Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine in Washington:
Now You See It, Now You Don't, 12 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 339 (1989)
(discussing substantive due process versus taking doctrines of the Washington and
U.S. Supreme Court).
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wherein the issue of broader protection under the State's damage
404
clause was the subject of differing opinions. The Court in
Sandberg ruled that no liability existed because the governmental
action did not involve direct interference with or denial of beneficial
405
use of property. Justice Compton dissented and recommended a
Lucas per se taking due to the Municipality of Anchorage's actions
that rendered subdivision lots economically infeasible for
development. 406  The dissent then stated that "[b]ecause of this
conclusion, I would find it unnecessary to reach the issue of 'broader
protection' afforded by Article I, Section 18 of the Alaska
Constitution."4 07 Since the Court decided Sandberg under the Alaska
Constitution and held no liability, the dissent commented "until today
[the court] has afforded property owners broader protection than that
conferred by the Fifth Amendment." 408 Regrettably, Sandberg is
typical of the Alaska Supreme Court decisions stating that the Alaska
Constitution provides broader protection, but the Court's opinions do
not explain how this is realized.409
B. Just Compensation for a Taking and Broader Protection
Measured as Damage under the Alaska Constitution
In State v. Hammer,4 10 the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that a
404. Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 557-561 (majority), 563 (dissent).
405. Id. at 558 n.8, 559.
406. Id at 563.
407. Id. (citing Alaska v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 824 (Alaska 1976)).
408. Id (emphasis in original).
409. See id. at 557-561; see also Arctic Slope, 834 P.2d at 138 (noting "the
difference between Alaska's takings clause and the federal clause is irrelevant to
this case" without explanation); Thomas Van Flein, The Baker Doctrine and the
New Federalism: Developing Independent Constitutional Principles under the
Alaska Constitution, 21 Alaska L. Rev. 227, 255 n. 145 (2004).
410. Hammer, 550 P.2d at 823-824.
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commercial tenant would be allowed to recover lost profits due to
business interruption caused by condemnation to the fee owner. The
Alaska Court reviewed federal precedent, which excluded any award
for incidental or consequential damages from just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment.411 Hammer decided that such a
restrictive rule under the Fifth Amendment would not control
because "the Alaska Constitution . . . expressly require[s]
compensation for damage to property." 412 Further, the Court found
the tenant's "business is 'property,' and it has been directly damaged
by the state in the taking of his leasehold." 413 Hammer has been
followed in Alaska as authority for awarding special damages in just
414
compensation.
The long-standing rule in federal jurisdictions has been that
just compensation is measured by fair market value.415 Fair market
value in federal just compensation law is ascertained objectively with
regard to market conditions rather than the subject property
specifically.4 16 Thus, any subjective elements of value associated
with the property owner, including commercial activity, good will, or
411. Id. at 823-826 nn. 4-18 (discussing federal cases).
412. Id. at 824 (emphasis in original).
413. Id. at 826.
414. E.g. Four Separate Parcels of Land v. City of Kodiak, 938 P.2d 448,
452 n. 9 (Alaska 1997) (citing Hammer); City of Kenai, 860 P.2d at 1244 (citing
Hammer). To the extent that Alaska's damage clause is construed to be consistent
with the California Constitution, see supra n. 386 and accompanying text, the latter
has been interpreted to allow consequential damages in inverse condemnation. E.g.
Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1088, 1090 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (following Albers, 398 P.2d 129)). In Yamagiwa, a local government was
liable for $36 million in property damage due to its creation of artificial wetlands
on property otherwise suitable for development. Id. at 1069-1070, 1090-1091,
1112.
415. E.g. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. U.S., 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
416. See e.g. U.S. v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1942) (some elements of
value must be eliminated that pertain to the parties' needs; "[t]hese elements must
be disregarded by the fact finding body in arriving at 'fair' market value"); see also
The Am. Inst. of Real Est. Appraisers, The Appraisal of Real Estate 20, 22 (11th
ed. 1996) ("market value ... is an objective value created by the collective patterns
of the market").
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other value to the owner, are disregarded.417 Accordingly, federal just
compensation law excludes consequential damage and elements
thereof to the owner. 4 18
The inadequacy of the fair market value standard in federal
just compensation law has been the subject of repeated criticism.4 19
The Supreme Court signaled its awareness of this criticism in Kelo
by acknowledging "questions about the fairness of the measure of
just compensation."420 Kelo provoked commotion in the media and
the public generally regarding the propriety of condemnation
authority for economic development purposes only.42 1 Therefore,
Hammer sets an important precedent by which the Alaska Supreme
Court has staked out broader measures of just compensation as
damage in the event of a taking or condemnation under the Alaska
Constitution.
417. E.g. U.S. v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511-512, 515-517
(1979) (court recognized "fair market value does not include the special value of
property to the owner"; replacement cost for substitute recreational facility rejected
as measure of compensation); Mitchell v. U.S., 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925)
(compensation excluded cannery business: "[i]f the business was destroyed, the
destruction was an unintended incident of the taking of land").
418. E.g. Miller, 317 U.S. at 376 ("the Constitution has never been
construed as requiring payment of consequential damages"); Yuba Nat. Resources,
Inc. v. U.S., 904 F.2d 1577, 1581 (9th Cir. 1990) ; see generally Uniform
Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions 57-58 (Interagency Land
Acquisition Conf., 2000) (discussing non compensability of consequential damages
in federal condemnation and citing cases).
419. E.g. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just
Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 677, 678-679 n. 5
(2005); Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J. 110, 111, 128-133 (2002); see also Hammer, 550 P.2d at 825 n. 16.
420. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 n. 21.
421. E.g. Timothy J. Dowling, How to Think About Kelo After the
Shouting Stops, 39 Urb. Law. 191 (2006); Merriam & Ross, supra n. 271, at 321.
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CONCLUSION
The takings jurisprudence of the Alaska Supreme Court
substantially follows that of the federal courts interpreting the
Takings Clause. Yet the Alaska Supreme Court has regularly stated
that Article I, Section 18, of the Alaska Constitution affords broader
protection to property rights than available under the Federal
Constitution. While Alaska cases may colorably support this
proposition in other contexts, the Alaska Supreme Court has yet to
clearly extend broader protection to regulatory taking cases.
Moreover, the disparity of results is not readily explainable in Alaska
Court taking opinions.
Though the ad hoc nature of takings decisions seems to be
unavoidable in state and federal courts' interpretation of Penn
Central, some measure of broader protection to regulatory taking
claimants would be a welcomed improvement to a case-specific
inquiry in Alaska. For example, the Alaska Supreme Court has
stated the economic advantages of ownership are relevant in
evaluating takings protection under the Alaska Constitution.
Assuming continued vitality to this pronouncement, then Alaska
courts should endeavor to give meaning to the economic advantages
of ownership in regulatory taking cases.
The Alaska courts could also clarify broader protection under
the Alaska Constitution with regard to Penn Central's investment-
backed expectations. This component to federal takings law has
consistently been criticized as incoherent and problematic. Although
takings liability is ultimately a constitutional and hence legal
question, Alaska courts should interpret investment expectations to
have a factual component that is objectively measurable by market
participants, or experts opining on the same, rather than a priori
formulation by jurists. Thus, the extent to which the market responds
to risks of governmental regulation and how such risks are measured
in investment decisions and property acquisitions could be far more
meaningful in Alaska regulatory takings cases than under the current
analysis.
Critics of federal takings law emphasize that fairness criteria
should ultimately explain the protection due property owners under
the Takings Clause. The articulation of fairness criteria would
mitigate the present uncertainties and deficiencies in Penn Central
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case specific inquiry applied in federal takings law. The Alaska
Supreme Court could contribute to this effort by focusing fairness
criteria on broader protection ostensibly available to property owners
under the Alaska Constitution.

